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Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth

Mark A. Mattaini and Kristen Atkinson

Abstract
Mohandas Gandhi often indicated that nonviolence was “a science,” and he appears to
have meant this literally. Consistent with this vision, in this paper, we outline and apply
principles of behavioral systems science, an emerging data-based approach to
understanding the dynamics of complex cultural systems, to the practice of constructive
noncooperation (Gandhi’s “constructive programme”). Although Gandhi emphasized
that constructive action was the most important and potent of nonviolent strategic
options, constructive alternatives have been the least developed in the literature of
nonviolent struggle. The reconceptualization of constructive noncooperation in
behavioral systems terms offered here suggests that rigorous analysis of Havel’s “living
in truth” and Gandhi’s “truth force” may be both possible and practically useful in
challenging oppression and supporting human rights.

“I am but a humble explorer of the science of nonviolence”
M. K. Gandhi (Young India, November 20, 1924)

Vast resources have been dedicated to refining the science and practice of
coercion, domination, killing, and war. Revolutionary movements and violent
insurgencies, arguably natural responses to societal repression, have often drawn on the
resulting knowledge and weaponry. There are, however, strong arguments for seeking
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other strategic options for challenging oppression (Ackerman and Krueger 1994;
Cortright 2006). Challenging an enemy with weapons in which he has an enormous
advantage is usually self-defeating; even when such challenge appears successful, violent
resistance commonly engenders a replacement system that is itself rooted in and
sustained by threat of force (Deming 1971; Michnik 1985; Sharp 2005). Václav Havel
(playwright, dissident, and ultimately the last president of Czechoslovakia and the first
president of the new Czech Republic), suggested that should a liberation movement rely
on violent resistance, “the future would be fatally stigmatized by the very means used to
secure it” (1978, 93).
Intriguingly, there are strong scientific arguments that support these observations.
Threat, violence, and other forms of coercion are deeply braided into contemporary
societies. Sidman (2001) integrated decades of research on individual and cultural
behavior to explain why coercive approaches can be so pervasive, so seductive—and so
damaging. Established science demonstrates that extreme coercion, even when it
produces immediate results, predictably and consistently produces grave side effects,
germinating the seeds of its own ultimate failure (Sidman).
Systemic and structural violations of basic human rights cannot usually be
resolved through negotiation processes (Sharp 2002). Fundamental rights ought not be
negotiated away, and appeals to common humanity under such circumstances have
seldom if ever resulted in the ceding of power. There is however one strategic option with
a demonstrated history of adequate power: active nonviolent struggle (Sharp 2005).
Hundreds of examples of nonviolent resistance to serious repression, with varying
degrees of success, have been documented and are available for analysis (see Ackerman
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and Duvall 2000; McCarthy and Sharp 1997; and Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999, for
examples).
Gandhi asserted that “we need experts to develop [nonviolence] into a science”
(2002, 117), but only quite modest resources have been dedicated to such work (cf. Bond
1988). Dedicating only a small percentage of the resources devoted to weapons, war,
insurgency and counterinsurgency, and other forms of violence to scientifically designed
observational, analytic, and experimental research related to nonviolent struggle might
yield enormous benefits (Martin 1997, 2005). Some valuable efforts have been made,
particularly drawing on social science theory and methods. For example, Downton and
Wehr (1998), drawing on and contributing to collective action theory, have examined
factors predicting persistent peace activism. Jasper (1998) presented a detailed analysis of
the important but neglected place of emotion in protest movements.
Klitgaard (1971) brought the power of game theory to analysis of Gandhi’s
tactics, a valuable approach that has some commonalities with the approach taken here.
Klitgaard fails, however, to make sense of demonstrably effective methods of nonviolent
struggle against “tyrants;” Sharp (2010) has clarified strategic options for such cases.
Nakre (1976) studied individual satyagrahi’s cognitive understandings of, and
commitment to nonviolent norms using survey methods. Wiltfang and McAdam (1991),
again using survey methods and multivariate analysis, studied predictors of willingness to
engage in high-risk and high-cost activities among activists. Such social science
investigations clearly have made valuable contributions. At the same time, the resources
committed to such work are dwarfed by those dedicated to violent alternatives.
In this paper we draw primarily on a different body of scientific work, behavior
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analysis and behavioral systems analysis (BSA; an approach for studying the dynamics of
complex behavioral and cultural systems). Behavior analysis and BSA draw primarily on
natural science rather than social science methods, and have more in common with
biology, ecology, and astronomy than with the social sciences (Johnston and
Pennypacker 1993). The social sciences generally bring statistical approaches to the study
of an array of hypothetical cognitive and emotional constructs and conditions grounded in
an array of midlevel theories (see, for example, Polletta and Jasper 2001). By contrast,
the principles and theory undergirding a natural science approach to behavior have
emerged from successive observations of individual organisms and cultural groups over
time, typically using experimental methods. Although their origins and usual methods are
quite distinct, the two strategic approaches also often draw from each other. Behavior
analysis and BSA and the theory emerging from them offer methods for tracing the
interlocking processes by which cultural practices and collective actions among
individuals and groups function to support oppression or justice (Behavior and Social
Issues 2004, 2006; Biglan 1995; Mattaini forthcoming; Mattaini and Strickland 2006),
and may suggest accessible points for nonviolent intervention.

Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression
Nonviolent struggle is neither passive nor primarily symbolic. Effective
nonviolent resistance rather involves “confront[ing] and undermin[ing] oppressive power
with forceful action” (Cortright 2006, 121). Understanding this, Barbara Deming, a
pivotal figure in the development of nonviolent struggle, called on oppressed groups and
their supporters to “pass from protest to resistance, from merely ‘symbolic’ actions to
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‘practical ones’” that disrupt an existing repressive equilibrium (1971, 216). Gandhi
himself had no patience with mere symbol, championing nonviolent but forceful action
(thus his emphasis on Satyagraha—commonly translated as “truth force”). Effective
nonviolent struggle involves threat or practice of active disruption of the increasingly
complex interdependencies of contemporary societies (Piven 2006; Sharp 2010).
Nonviolent struggle is not designed to be safe; resistance to serious oppression is always
dangerous. It is, however, designed to be powerful.
Gene Sharp, the doyen of nonviolence theory, offers a partial list of 198 methods
of nonviolent action, divided into three major classes: (1) nonviolent protest and
persuasion, (2) noncooperation; and (3) nonviolent intervention (1959, 1973, 2005). With
such extensive possibilities, the choice of strategic and tactical options under varying
contextual conditions is challenging (Aspey and Eppler 2001). While some (including
Gandhi) have confidently asserted that nonviolent action is potentially a “full substitute”
[for armed revolt] (Gandhi 1945, 3), others have strongly disagreed (Rigby 1995). Rigby
concludes that nonviolence is not a functional alternative to violence; that certain ends
can only be achieved through violence. This argument is based on the author’s notion
that certain military interventions—such as pacifying a group of people by bombing
them—hold no nonviolent alternative. Whether “pacifying” an oppressed people, by
bombing or otherwise, is a worthy end is of course a separate question. A scientific
perspective requires maintaining an open mind about the issue of substitutability. The
extent to which nonviolence can substitute for force, whether in resistance, insurgent,
military, or even policing situations, can only be determined through the kinds of
rigorous study to which behavioral systems analysis can contribute.
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Constructive Noncooperation
Gandhi believed that the central power of nonviolence lay in creating and
constructing—rather than in obstructing. What he termed the constructive programme
focused on building an autonomous healthy society that refused to rely on resources
provided by the oppressor, while creating strategic improvements in practical, social,
intellectual, and spiritual dimensions of daily life (Gandhi 1929, 1945; Nagler 2004).
Gandhi understood the constructive program (or constructive noncooperation, Schell’s
[2003] term which we adopt in this paper) to be the most important strategic option for
nonviolent action (Gandhi 1945). Paradoxically, this option is the single major dimension
of nonviolent struggle that has been least fully explored and developed.
Gandhi’s constructive programme was designed to support “construction of
Poorna Swaraj or complete Independence by truthful and nonviolent means” (Gandhi
1945, 5). The core of the constructive programme is “living the social and political order
[one] wants to create” (Hettne 1976, 230). Gandhi believed that if the population acted
autonomously, the substance of political power would thereby already be gained; the
inevitable subsequent takeover of the structures of government would be merely “a
shadow, an emblem” (quoted in Schell 2003, 140). He was quite specific as to how
independence in the economic, educational and governance arenas could be achieved in
the Indian subcontinent; the final (1945) version of his pamphlet Constructive
Programme was organized into 18 sections, including among others khadi (the
independent production of local cloth, often symbolized by the spinning wheel),
emphasis on local languages rather than the English of the colonial oppressors, and the
full incorporation of all groups including Dalits (“untouchables”), peasants, lepers,
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women, and aboriginals into society. Gandhi clearly understood that an educational
system controlled by the colonial government profoundly strengthened foreign rule, and
therefore included both a new approach to the education of children, and liberatory
education (“true political education of the adult by word of mouth,” p. 15) in his program.
Constructive noncooperation on one level is a route to improving life for an
oppressed group or population, but by its very nature is simultaneously a means of active
resistance. Relationships of dependence and fear are essential to maintaining repressive
structures; constructive programs directly challenge both. At its heart constructive
noncooperation involves the construction and sustainment of a new, self-reliant and selfdetermining culture within the shell of—and in resistance to—structural oppression.
Havel, who spoke of constructive noncooperation as living in truth (see below), noted,
“As long as it remains what it is, the practice of living within the truth cannot fail to be a
threat to the system” (1978, 112).
Other Views of Constructive Noncooperation
Gene Sharp (2002), whose work has been and is being used by resistance
movements in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Palestine, and at least two dozen other countries
over several decades, describes a process of “escalating freedom” as a central dimension
of defying oppression under a dictatorship. Sharp indicates that the “growth of
autonomous social, economic, cultural and political institutions progressively expands the
‘democratic space’ of the society and shrinks the control of the dictatorship” (p. 58), in
time leading to “de facto freedom” (p. 59).
Ackerman and Kruegler (1994) view constructive programs somewhat differently:

Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1

9

Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth

Our use of the phrase “constructive work” is compatible, but not
precisely synonymous with, Gandhi’s usage. In his philosophy, a
constructive program was a voluntary effort outside the aegis of the
state, which had the dual purpose of redressing material inequalities
and training the participants to be more competent and self-reliant. We
refer to positive actions that can be taken primarily with a view to
improving the material situation in which a conflict may be developed.
(p. 53)
For Ackerman and Kruegler, then, constructive work is primarily a step toward preparing
for nonviolent struggles of other kinds—a means toward an end, rather than, as it was for
Gandhi, the central strategy for escaping oppression and achieving autonomy. There are
many examples of such work to improve the material situation of African America in the
century leading up to the civil rights struggles of the 1960s (du Bois 1907; Gordon 1991).
The essential distinction between constructive noncooperation and most other
forms of nonviolent social action (e.g., persuasion, protest, disruption, obstruction, or
boycotts) is that the immediate targets for change in constructive nonviolent action are
the actions of the resistance community itself, rather than the opponent. Havel notes,
“The primary purpose … is always … to have an impact on society, not to affect the
power structure” (1978, 105). Such changes by and within the resistance community are
important not just as a means, but rather as the primary end in constructive efforts.
Because of the interdependencies between the grievance group and the opponent,
however, ultimately the opponent’s actions also shift in response.
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Strategic Principles Emerging from Behavioral Systems Analysis
Those studying nonviolence have in recent years reached a near consensus that
explicit attention to strategic analysis and planning can increase the likelihood of positive
outcomes (e.g., Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Cortright 2006; Helvey 2004; Sharp
2005). For example, Sharp identifies 6 sources of political power (authority, human
resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions—
termed by Helvey “pillars of support”, p. 9), and describes strategic approaches for
restricting or withholding each in his essential volume, From Dictatorship to Democracy
(2002) and elsewhere, an analysis that is further detailed by Helvey. As discussed later,
established principles of behavioral systems science can help to further refine strategic
approaches for effective resistance in politically complex situations.
Studies of dynamic systems and complex phenomena have established that
complexity typically is emergent from repetition and continuous self-organization of
simple processes and patterns over time (e.g., Granic and Patterson 2006; Wolfram
2002). Behavioral systems analysis, as discussed later, has an austere and parsimonious
elegance grounded in experimental history. The approach begins with a modest number
of empirically well-established principles explaining the dynamics that shape and
maintain actions by individuals and small groups, then moves to study how those simple
elements interlock to produce complex cultural-level processes and outcomes
(Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward 2010; Mattaini 2008). In the material that follows we
begin by outlining a set of key principles established by behavioral research; we then
sketch analytic methods for understanding how those principles contribute to explaining
the emergence of cultural processes from networks of relatively simple transactions.
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Table 1. Central Principles of Behavior Analysis Contributing to BSA
•

Constructional approaches that shape and sustain desirable actions have significant
advantages over approaches that emphasize suppressing undesirable actions.

•

Both individual behavior and the processes within and among behavioral systems are
selected by their consequences.

•

Behavior is allocated to possible alternatives proportionately to how successful those
alternatives are in producing desirable outcomes within a specific environmental
context (the matching law).

•

Extinction (planned discontinuation of previous available cooperation and
compliance) is a central dynamic in nonviolent social action, including constructive
noncooperation.

•

Changes in values and attitudes can occur through shifts in equivalence relations—
ways of partitioning the world analogous to set theory.

•

Creativity is essential to maintaining individual action and cultural practices over
time.

Key Behavior Analytic Principles
A number of well-established principles of behavioral analytic science have
particular relevance for higher-level BSA, and therefore for strategic analysis in
constructive noncooperation. Several of those principles, listed above in Table 1, are
briefly summarized in the material that follows, with reference to their places in
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nonviolent struggle. The principles listed are illustrative rather than exhaustive, but each
is important for the analysis of constructive noncooperation.
The Advantages of “Constructional” Approaches
One well-established principle with broad applicability to strategic nonviolent
struggle is the primacy of constructional (Goldiamond 1975) options over suppressive
and coercive alternatives (Sidman 2001). Encouraging new, desirable action occurs
through providing access to improved personal and group outcomes and conditions,
which tend to stabilize the new practices (Goldiamond). Suppression of undesirable
actions through coercion and threat typically requires constant surveillance, and tends to
evoke resistance, defection, and efforts to exert coercive countercontrol (Sidman). Such
coercive repression structures what Havel refers to as a persistent “latent social crisis”
(1978, 105), leaving the oppressive system ever fragile and vulnerable to challenge, while
increasing overall levels of fear and distrust within a society. And as noted by Kurlansky,
“In most of history, people motivated by fear have not acted well” (2008, 97).
Constructional processes can often reduce undesirable actions indirectly, without
the need for threats or punishment (Goldiamond 1975). Encouraging a resister to “stand
and endure” attack by using constructional approaches produces substantively different
outcomes than attempting to suppress “running” or “fighting back” through
condemnation, coercion, or threat. Constructing the “stand and endure” repertoire helps
prevent escape or counter-aggression, but without the side effects that are likely from
such suppressive techniques. Constructive noncooperation is largely a constructional
resistance strategy.
Selection by Consequences
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Why do people, whether members of resistance movements or those maintaining
oppression, do what they do—and how can that be changed? Why do members of groups
act in concert? Within the framework of behavioral systems theory, the central process
involved is selection by consequences (Skinner 1981). Both individual behavior and
collective action are shaped and maintained by selective processes closely analogous to
natural selection (Biglan 1995, 2003). A selectionist framework emphasizes that, all else
being equal, actions that “work” within particular environmental conditions tend to be
repeated (those actions are selected by their success in the world), both by individuals
and by groups. Actions that produce no effect or negative effects tend not to be repeated,
and are typically discouraged by social groups. Selection has some disadvantages.
Because selection emerges from historical conditions, it may not produce responses that
are effective when conditions changed. Piven (2006) terms this “the drag of the past” (p.
35). Analysis of behavioral systems dynamics present in the moment may help to
mitigate this problem. (Other contextual conditions, discussed later, can potentiate or
attenuate the power of selecting consequences.) The selection principle, which has
considerable face validity, is being actively studied and refined in BSA (Biglan 2003;
Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward 2010; Mattaini 2008).
The critical difference in a selectionist perspective as contrasted with more
cognitive understandings of human action common in contemporary social science lies in
a central emphasis on changes in the environment, rather than in the person. As will be
clear in what follows, this perspective offers novel options for social action. Neither the
cognitive nor the selectionist approach should be viewed as “truth;” each has unique
contributions to make.
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Clarification of goals (what actions by whom are desired), the consequences and
contexts that select those actions, and shifts in systems dynamics that could restructure
consequential and contextual factors is the heart of strategic analysis (Mattaini,
forthcoming; see also Helvey 2004, on strategic analysis). After the Stonewall Inn protest
by 2000 members of the gay community in New York City in 1969, for example,
activists intentionally targeted “coming out” (not only to each other, but to family,
friends, co-workers and other contacts) as the desired behavior, and intentionally
arranged strong social consequences that were likely to select that action (D’Emilio
1983). In a reverberating process, the increased collective power that resulted encouraged
members of the gay community to escalate their efforts to achieve an array of targeted
social changes, ultimately with major cultural effects.
The Matching Law
As resistance movements strengthen their internal networks and advance their
autonomy, they are concurrently developing an internal culture of mutual reinforcement
that can further support both desired actions and autonomy—initiating a self-organizing
and self-sustaining collective dynamic. As individuals gain support, resources, and
recognition from within the activist culture and the societal changes it initiates, whatever
resources and blandishments the oppressor has to offer become less attractive—their
relative value is eroded. There is a well-established mathematical formula, the matching
law, which predicts with surprising precision how human behavior will be allocated
among possible choices under such circumstances (McDowell 1988, 2005). In general,
the matching research indicates that action is allocated among possible alternatives
proportionate to the relative level of reward each offers (Herrnstein 1997). Allocation of
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behavior is not precisely proportionate, but the variations are well understood, and the
approximation here is close enough for current purposes (McDowell 2005). If
participating in the resistance provides the most desirable outcomes (including personal
satisfaction and opportunities to act in altruistically valued ways), those actions are likely
to occur at high rates.
Significantly, matching also accounts for what often are seen as inconsistencies in
behavior. Consider, for example, current discussions of the actions of persons and
communities in Afghanistan who may at one moment appear to ally with Western
counterinsurgency efforts, and at other times with the insurgents. In part, differences in
moment-by-moment context are obviously involved—one tends to agree with the armed
man standing in front of them—but each side often has something distinctive to offer.
Typically, human beings do not exclusively choose the single option that will maximize
overall rewards; rather they allocate behavior between options proportionately to the
relative levels of payoffs they each offer, an approach that may have had survival value
(Herrnstein 1997; McDowell 1988). If each side offers something of value, some
cooperation will be allocated to each where this is possible. Such choices may be a
resilient strategy under changing conditions, and should not be viewed as irrational.
The Central Role of Extinction in Nonviolent Struggle
The extinction process is perhaps the most common and powerful behavioral
dynamic involved in nonviolent struggle (at least two-thirds of Sharp’s 198 methods
involve extinction). Extinction is also among the best understood processes in all of
behavioral science (Kazdin 2008; Malott and Trojan 2008). All else being equal, when a
behavior has previously produced a positive outcome, that behavior is likely to be
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repeated. If, however, a previously established positive outcome consistently stops
occurring, the rate of the associated behavior ultimately will decline. For example,
repressive governments commonly maintain their power through threats, intimidation,
and violence; they continue to use these strategies because they produce compliance.
Most forms of nonviolent action involve withdrawing cooperation and compliance, even
in the face of threats, coercion and violence, and such noncompliance has proven
powerful (the United States civil rights struggle relied primarily on these strategic
options). When their coercive actions no longer produce compliance, however, the typical
response is a rapid escalation of coercive efforts. This escalation is technically termed an
extinction burst (Kazdin 2008; Sidman 2001). Such escalation, from mild threats to fire
hoses, dogs, and murder was evident in the U.S. civil rights struggle (Finkelman 2009).
Resistance movements need to be prepared to maintain nonviolent discipline until such
escalation has run its course, knowing that it eventually will if it consistently fails to
produce an effect.
Constructive noncooperation inherently involves a substantial element of
extinction in its refusal to be intimidated or cooperate with injustice. Escalation of
oppressive actions in response is then to be expected; power lies in maintaining the
resistance in the face of such responses. If, however, the resistance movement succumbs
to such escalation, they reinforce escalation of coercion. Standing firm even in the face of
gunfire (as the Pashtun resistance did at Kissa Khani Bazaar in Peshawar in 1930; Raqib
2005) is a powerful strategic choice. Turning and running, natural as that may be, is
usually worse than not engaging at all—it not only gives the opponent a “win” but is also
likely to evoke more severe treatment in future campaigns.
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Shifting Equivalence Relations
Downton and Wehr (1998) identified attitudinal availability, specifically a set of
activist beliefs and values, as central to maintaining activist commitment. Recent
advances in behavioral research have contributed to the rigor of our understanding of
attitudes, values, and related verbal behavior (Clayton and Hayes 1999). Think, for
example, about the shift from imported cloth to that made locally—one strategic element
in the American Revolution (homespun), Te Whiti’s 1867 campaign to protect Maori
rights in New Zealand, and Gandhi’s Indian Independence movement (khadi), among
others. In each case, the colonized people had come to value goods that profit the
colonizer more highly than the less expensive locally-made goods, thus reinforcing
dependence while sapping local resources. Technically, new equivalence relations had
been formed: {British cloth ≈ high quality ≈ cultured}, and {local cloth ≈ poor quality ≈
primitive}; the “≈” symbol indicating equivalence along one or more important
dimensions (Sidman 1995). Equivalent constructs function interchangeably in selective
processes (Sidman).
Understanding of the place of such equivalence relations in human behavior and
cognition has advanced dramatically in the past two decades, and offers important keys to
changing values and attitudes. Equivalence relation theory connects human behavior to
mathematical set theory. Relational frame theory (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche
2001) is a related body of work that differs theoretically in significant ways (Clayton and
Hayes 1999), but for our purposes here the differences are not substantive.
Once established, equivalence relations are often quite insensitive to
environmental changes (Masuda et al. 2009), and the processes of shifting equivalences
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can be counter-intuitive. For example, repeating “local cloth is not primitive” multiple
times paradoxically is likely to strengthen the equivalence between “local cloth” and
“primitive”—while repeating and reinforcing a conflicting equivalence like {local cloth≈
support for the resistance} can attenuate the problem equivalence (Dixon, Dymond,
Rehfeldt, Roche, and Zlomke 2003; Spradlin, Saunders, and Saunders 1992).
There is also recent related research that may be helpful in supporting courageous
action among resisters, based on acceptance and commitment theory (Hayes, Strosahl,
and Wilson 1999). In acceptance and commitment work, there is no effort to block out
fear. Rather, fear is accepted as natural under the circumstances—but fear or not,
acceptance and commitment research indicates that commitments to act in accordance
with one’s values can be made and honored (Biglan, Hayes, and Pistorello 2008). The
shift is roughly from, “I’d like to resist, but I am too afraid” to “I accept that I am afraid,
and I am nevertheless committed to resisting.” Attempts to directly block the experience
of fear (“don’t be afraid”) may have the opposite effect, and often produce
immobilization.
Creativity
The importance of creativity, particularly for sustaining activism over time, also
emerged clearly in Downton and Wehr’s study of persistent activists (1998). The
behavioral underpinnings seem clear. The impact of both positive and negative
consequences tends to fade over time in a behavioral process termed satiation (Malott
and Trojan 2008). As can happen with a favorite food, tactics that were once exciting and
powerful for participants in a nonviolent campaign become less reinforcing for
participants—and less disruptive for the opponent—with repetition. While consistency of
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response is essential in strategies relying on extinction, extended campaigns generally
require attention to keeping activists interested and opponents off-balance through new
initiatives and tactical shifts.
Behavioral Systems Analysis
Behavioral systems analysis clarifies the dynamics of interlocking actions among
people and transactions among human groups (Mattaini 2008; Sandakur 2006).
Considerable scientific attention is currently being directed toward understanding the
behavioral dynamics that shape organizations, collectives, and cultural groups using these
methods (e.g., Malott 2003; Journal of Organizational Management 2009a, 2009b;
Behavior and Social Issues 2006). These analyses contribute to a unique and rigorous
understanding of how basic behavioral processes are organized into collective action, and
therefore have important implications for addressing critical human problems (Biglan
1995; Mattaini and Thyer 1996; Todorov 2009). Applications of BSA for clarifying the
exercise of nonviolent power have been almost nonexistent (Mattaini 2003), but the
material that follows suggests that there is value in taking this perspective.
Collective nonviolent action by definition requires the coordinated behavior of a
group of people. Sustaining such coordinated action requires the construction of
culture—patterns of mutual reinforcement for shared practices (Skinner 1984). For
example, the history of nonviolent action indicates that solidarity, discipline, courage,
living in truth, and the sharing of power among members of a movement are among the
essential requirements for effective nonviolent struggle (e.g., Ganz 2009; Klitgaard 1971;
Sharp 2005). Resistance groups whose internal cultures encourage those practices are
likely to survive, and widespread participation in those practices progressively expands
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collective power (Sharp 2002). BSA offers a methodology for embedding these dynamics
within the activist/grievance group by providing analytic tools for capturing the dynamics
of interlocking transactions among multiple classes of actors.
For example, even a relatively simple (but enormously courageous) campaign like
that of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Buenos Aires, 1977-1983) involved intra and
intergroup transactions among mothers of the “disappeared,” the military junta,
functionaries of the civilian government, paramilitaries, and ultimately workers and the
middle class (Paulson 2005a). Strategically, it seems evident that being able to analyze
the matrix of interlocking factors contributing to current undesirable actions, as well as
those that could encourage desired actions within and between these groups could be of
value. Both retrospective analyses of former campaigns and proactive analysis for current
campaigns may be valuable. The material that follows describes some of the analytic
methods and tools on which BSA draws. (For fuller presentations, see Mattaini 2008,
and Mattaini, forthcoming.)
Analytic Diagramming
The education of women and girls in Afghanistan is widely recognized as crucial
in terms of both human rights and development (Yacoobi 2008). Despite severe threats
and punitive violence, in a contemporary example of constructive noncooperation, many
Afghan women girls continue to attend schools (Maron 2009; Wiseman 2010). A sample
diagram analyzing the practice of attending school among Afghan girls (the class of
actors) is shown in Figure 1. Visualization tools have proven useful for BSA, as they
have for other sciences dealing with complexity, because their wide bandwidth enables
concurrent attention to multiple variables (Mattaini 1993).
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Figure 1. A practice diagram, simplified for presentation, tracing key antecedent,
structural, and consequent factors associated with attending school for a young Afghan woman.
To encourage attendance, levels of motivating antecedents might be increased, adequate levels of
structural antecedents assured, levels of positive consequences increased, and levels of negative
consequences decreased. Nearly all such changes involve the practices of interlocking groups.
(Note that for very young girls, the primary emphasis would be on practices of parents, although
the courage of the very young should not be dismissed.)

Note that such practice diagrams are nomothetic representations of factors
relatively common to multiple individual cases; what is being analyzed is not one
person’s behavior, but a practice shared by a class of actors. Examples of motivating
antecedent variables are shown on the left, structural variables below the practice, and
consequences (both positive and aversive) to the right. Such diagrams can be developed
from observations, experiences of and interviews with those who know the situation on
the ground most intimately, archival information, and field experiments. Factors selected
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for inclusion in such analyses are determined in significant part by application of basic
behavioral principles, particularly those discussed earlier. From this kind of analysis, a
variety of possible interventions (antecedent, structural, or consequential) can commonly
be derived. This, however, is only the first level of analysis. The practices of other classes
of actors (parents, tribal and religious leaders, NGOs, the Taliban, and others) constitute
the behavioral and cultural field within which school attendance occurs. The principle
value of BSA therefore lies in aggregating multiple analyses to explore the interlocks
between multiple practices among multiple classes of actors, as discussed below.
Force Field Analysis
Before turning to aggregational analysis, one additional useful tool should be
briefly noted. Force field analysis was first developed by Kurt Lewin (1951), and
variations have been widely used as analytic tools in organizational and community
change efforts (Brager and Holloway 1993; Hanson 2007). On a force field diagram as
used in BSA, motivating (“driving”) factors that support a desirable practice are
displayed in a single column on the left of the page, and factors that restrain that practice
by a particular class of actors (e.g., young women, religious leaders) in a column on the
right, with a vertical line between the two. Arrows are drawn from each motivating or
restraining factor toward the middle line; the relative weight (width) of each arrow is
determined based on the strength of each factor. Conceptually, motivating forces “push”
the line toward the goal state, while restraining forces push away. Possible action points
include increasing the strength of motivating forces, adding additional motivating forces,
decreasing the strength of restraining forces, or some combination of these. Force field
diagrams can be developed with members of the activist or grievance group, and can be
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helpful in ensuring completeness of analysis. Data from these diagrams can be used to
refine the practice diagrams discussed earlier. It is important to note that actually drawing
such diagrams, and not just thinking about them, typically produces a more complete
analysis (Mattaini 1993).
Aggregating Practice Diagrams
The full power of BSA emerges from analysis of the transactional interlocks
among the practices of multiple classes of actors. There are always reciprocal interlocks
between oppressors and the grievance population, but the actions of other classes of
actors (military, police, paramilitary, religious, business, non-governmental, tribal,
consumers locally and globally, and many others) may be involved in maintaining
structural violence and oppression, and may also play roles in challenging those
conditions. Multiple groups may be involved in structuring or weakening Sharp’s pillars
of support, in shifting attitudes and beliefs, and in supporting cultures of resistance.
Take as an example a (conceptually) simple case of a powerful dictator, and an
oppressed population undertaking a campaign of constructive noncooperation. BSA
would examine factors for motivating constructive action by progressively larger
numbers of resisters (diagramming and force-field analysis could be part of that work).
The analysis would also, however, use similar tools to analyze factors shaping the
reactions of the dictator. Such analysis would involve looking at the classes of actors who
could affect his actions, e.g., police, bureaucrats, workers, and how they might do so.
Antecedent, structural, and consequential factors that might affect the practices of each of
those groups can also be examined. Where BSA offers its full power is in integrating all
of this. It is possible to aggregate practice diagrams that clarify in a single graphic the
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most powerful factors scaffolding the practices of each of the groups that structure the
current matrix of exchanges, and in a separate graphic the interlocks that might
characterize the desired end state. Such diagrams might clarify, for example, the impact
of weakening cooperation of civil service workers with the dictator, the possible impact
of religious practices to support that shift, and the practices of the resistance movement
that might motivate religious leaders to do so. The same figure might include practices of
industrial workers required to support the economy, offering additional strategic options.
Although drawing on the best available information, such analyses would necessarily be
fluid and dynamic, based on shifts in conditions and events as well as further information
as it emerges. (For an example of such aggregated diagramming, see Mattaini and
Strickland 2006.)
Levels and Examples of Constructive Noncooperation
Successful nonviolent struggle emerges from action at multiple levels, based on
strategic analysis of existing interlocking systems dynamics. For heuristic purposes, we
discuss here three levels of constructive noncooperation as resistance: (a) “living in
truth”; (b) the development of parallel institutions; and (c) the broad emergence of
cultures of constructive resistance. These manifestations support each other, and
commonly blend seamlessly at their borders.
Living in Truth
Nakhre stated, “Gandhi derived the word Satyagraha, from the words ‘Satya’
meaning truth and ‘Agra-ha’ meaning grip taking. Literally it means ‘holding on to the
truth’”—even in the face of pressure to submit (1976, 186). Living under oppressive
conditions as if all is well—“living within the lie” in Václav Havel’s (1978) terms—does
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tremendous personal and collective damage. As Havel notes, in addition to damaging
themselves, in living the lie “individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the
system, are the system” (quoted in Schell 2003, 196). A seemingly counterintuitive
reality widely recognized by nonviolence practitioners and theorists of resistance
movements is that oppressive systems require the cooperation of the oppressed to survive
(Freire 1972; Gandhi 1945; Piven 2006; Sharp 2005). The behavioral dynamics are clear:
The oppressor threatens and coerces; the population cooperates to avoid further coercion,
living as well as appears possible within the narrow confines involved. Because of the
interdependencies present, only if social institutions and the general population continue
to cooperate can coercive power be maintained.
Noncooperation begins with individual acts of truth. Havel indicates that most
expressions of truth are “elementary revolts against manipulation: you simply straighten
your backbone and live in greater dignity as an individual” (1978, 85). He further states:
The point where living within the truth ceases to be a mere negation of living
with a lie and becomes articulate in a particular way, is the point at which
something is born that might be called the “independent spiritual, social and
political life of society” … living within the truth becomes articulate and
materializes in a visible way. (p. 85)
For Havel, living in truth may begin with acts as small as placing a poster in a window
(or refusing to do so) or circulating the script of a play that cannot be publicly produced
through an underground network. Typically, actions taken are one step closer to those
that would occur in an autonomous society, but not enough to evoke consequences for
which the person is not prepared.
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Living in truth for Havel is a form of resistance—but it is more. As Schell (2003)
notes:
Living in truth—directly doing in your immediate surroundings what you
think needs doing, saying what you think is true and needs saying, acting the
way you think people should act—is a form of protest, Havel admits, against
living in the lie, and so those who try to live in truth are indeed an
opposition…. But [for Havel] that is neither all they are nor the main thing
they are. Before living in truth is a protest, it is an affirmation. (p. 196)
As Havel notes, in acting in this way, “something is born” (p. 85); or as noted by
Horton and Freire, “We make the road by walking” (1990). The critical question here is
what initiates and maintains such individual action. Here the power of selection is clear;
while individual action may and often does emerge immediately as a reaction to coercive
conditions, constructive action over the longer term must produce positive results for
those involved, or extinction will occur. Although some individuals can sustain long
periods of autonomous action, for most, continued resistance in the face of threats or pain
is most likely when social, material, spiritual, and other supports are provided. Given the
challenges, living in truth is most likely to be sustained, then, within parallel structures
and cultures of resistance.
Parallel Structures
A key strategic option in campaigns of constructive noncooperation is the creation
of what the Czech activist Václav Benda termed parallel structures—a step toward
constructing a new society within the shell of the old as populations move toward living
in truth. Those structures may be cultural, economic, educational, labor, political,
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religious, legal, medical—historical examples are extensive, each emerging from local
realities. In each case, parallel institutions take on necessary communal responsibilities
while denying the government legitimacy. Havel (1978) notes:
These parallel structures, it may be said, represent the most articulated
expressions so far of “living within the truth.” One of the most
important tasks the “dissident movements” have set themselves is to
support and develop them … For what else are parallel structures than
an area where a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony
with its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with
those aims? (p. 102)
During the Vietnam War, the construction of hiérarchies paralléles (Fall 1967),
arrangements that structured autonomous political, economic, and social governance,
were the core of the ultimately successful National Liberation Front (NLF or Viet Cong)
strategy (Schell 2003). These parallel structures, “the true innovation of the Indochina
war” (Fall, p. 133), organized the population into networks of interlocking associations
and governing groups (the Lien-Viet) by which the NLF took and maintained control of
countryside ostensibly occupied by the enemy. This dynamic, popularly supported
underground system gradually assumed responsibility for supporting and directing the
lives of the population. For individuals and for communities, the consequences of allying
themselves with the NLF were more reinforcing than allying themselves with the
government—a clear example of selection. The matching law suggests that some
cooperation with the government would also continue, particularly when surveillance was
present or something was immediately to be gained, and that too occurred. Ultimately,
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the Lien Viet strategy, rather than military action, was largely responsible for the outcome
of the struggle (Fall; Schell).
There are many other examples of the development of parallel structures
throughout the history of resistance movements. Alternative institutions were an
important component of the resistant movements in South Asia and South Africa
(Easwaran 1999; McCarthy and Sharp 1997). Barred from dominant society
opportunities, key segments of African America have from the earliest days in the New
World constructed independent Black media, women’s associations, churches, and
political and civic associations, building the financial, human and social capital on which
survival, resistance, and liberation rely (Finkelman 2009; Gordon 1991). Black
Nationalist and Black Power movements (both violent and nonviolent) emphasized selfreliance including the construction of parallel structures and institutions (Breitman 1994;
Robinson 2001). These parallel structures also provided a grounding for the eventual
obstructive campaigns working for social and economic justice. In indigenous
communities in Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S., parallel justice systems based in
traditional practices are emerging (Ross 2006; Sawatsky 2009). Grounded in communal
and restorative processes, these systems remove Native (and in some cases non-Native)
offenders from the Western criminal justice system, which is experienced as both
oppressive and counterproductive.
The behavioral systems dynamics of parallel institutions explain their power.
Building an autonomous resistance community functions as a constructive challenge that
is difficult to effectively combat even as it offers important resources and experiences for
the community, thereby selecting continued and increasing participation. For example,
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prior to the American Revolution, colonists often refused to serve as jurors in British
courts (Schell 2003). Independent colonial justice arrangements were established as
needed, however, to maintain public order. Furthermore, the coercive efforts of the
British government could not bring the colonists to cooperate—those efforts were put on
extinction. Parallel structures often offer better outcomes from the perspective of
participants (more responsive justice, or land reform, for example), selecting
participation. Furthermore, parallel institutions come to participate in equivalence
relations with autonomy, freedom, and resistance for the grievance population. At the
same time, parallel institutions by their very existence deny important consequences that
have previously selected the actions of the oppressing group, destabilizing and disrupting
the interdependencies that have maintained the power of the oppressor.
Strengthening Civil Society as a Culture of Constructive Resistance
Constructive noncooperation ultimately involves the progressive shaping of an
autonomous civil society or culture that functions largely independently of official or
accustomed arrangements (Gandhi 1945; Havel 1978; Schell 2003). Such civil society is
built through the development of interlocking, independent organizations and institutions,
but most importantly through the emergence of self-organizing associations and
communities (Havel), which by their very nature reduce dependence on oppressive power
structures. What we know about emergence in many contemporary scientific disciplines
including physics, biology, and behavioral systems analysis suggests that once such selforganizing systems appear, they may under the right conditions initiate self-amplifying
processes that lead to progressively greater differentiation and complexity—so a small
beginning may ultimately lead to cascading and irreversible changes (Mattaini 2008).
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According to behavioral systems science, culture (a set of common values and
actions) emerges from interdependencies within a group. Recognizing this, a culture of
resistance can be consciously created in which actions supporting autonomy are selected
through shifts in consequences members of the group provide for each other, as well as
through shifts in equivalence relations. Such actions as maintaining nonviolent discipline,
living in truth, and constructing valued parallel institutions can be constructed
intentionally based on an analysis of the specific interdependencies present in the
situation. In Havel’s Czechoslovakia, for example, the Charter 77 movement supported
and sustained the actions of dissident leaders, and inspired further individual and
collective action, progressively weakening the communist government.
The emergence of cultures of constructive resistance was central to the
revolutions in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, and ultimately brought down the
Soviet Union (Schell 2003). Leading activists—Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik
in Poland, and Gyorgy Konrád in Hungary in particular—agreed that it would be a
mistake to try to directly overthrow the system (Schell). Rather, they believed that the
focus of resistance should be on “achieving immediate changes in daily life,”
strengthening autonomous civil society (Schell, p. 193). Schell indicates, for example,
that “Konrád wanted society to ‘absorb’ the regime in a ‘ripening social transformation.’
He wanted the ‘iceberg of power … melted from within’” (p. 198).
The Polish people resisted occupation and oppression first by the Nazis, and later
by the Soviet Union. This resistance included both violent and nonviolent elements. The
first substantial rebellion against the Soviet Union, which was ruthlessly suppressed,
occurred in 1956, and a number of further periods of major unrest by labor and
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intellectuals followed over the next 25 years. By the 1970s, it was clear to Polish activists
that efforts to directly challenge the Communist government (with its Soviet support)
could not succeed at that time—but also that beginning to make improvements in
people’s lives did not require such a challenge. In 1976, Michnik called for the
construction of a “post-totalitarian” society, in which society rebels against the
totalitarian government by setting up its own institutions, and “giv[ing] directives to the
people on how to behave, not to the powers on how to reform themselves” (quoted in
Schell 2003, 195). The government would thus become increasingly irrelevant. An
important beginning in Poland was the Committee for Defense of Workers, established in
the mid-1970s by intellectuals to help establish unofficial labor organizations; provide
assistance to workers—which was labeled “social work” (Schell 2003, 195); and support
independent, underground press and publishing efforts, among other activities (Paulson
2005b; McCarthy and Sharp 1997).
In another example, in the 1930s, Badshah Khan, the Pashtun “Frontier Gandhi,”
formed a militantly nonviolent Muslim army (the Khudai Khidmatgars or Servants of
God) 100,000 strong at its peak (Banerjee 2000) to resist the British in the tribal areas
between present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of the work of the Khudai
Khidmatgars consisted of constructive work in educational, economic, and community
development, and the development and support of local youth leagues, councils, and a
newspaper, in close alliance with Gandhi’s efforts to the south (Easwaran 1999; Raqib
2005). Those developments clearly contributed to the end of the British colonial era—and
suggest that even in this conflict-torn area, nonviolent action and the construction of
cultures of constructive resistance have serious potential.
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The growth of queer cultures, both within the U.S. and abroad, can also be viewed
through the lens of constructive noncooperation. Barred from full participation in civic
life, queer-identified people have created independent communities and institutions in
response to systemic discrimination (Boyd 2003; Ingram, Bouthillette, and Retter 1997).
Queer activists have established health care and social service systems, and have
promoted economic self-reliance through the establishment of a variety of thriving queerowned and queer-friendly businesses, foundations and scholarship programs. The efforts
of queer activists to resist oppression and improve their lives through tactics of
constructive noncooperation has helped foster a sense of cultural self-determination and
expand options for self-expression in family life, relationships, gender identity, art forms
and consumer power. These queer communities have served as the foundation for
establishing political power (D’Emilio 1983) through a wide variety of political groups
and associations, including Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays, Lambda
Legal, the Human Rights Campaign, Gay and Lesbian Alliance against Defamation,
American Civil Liberties Union, Stonewall Democrats, Log Cabin Republicans, and the
Gay Lesbian and Straight Education Network, to name a few.

Conclusion
During the late twentieth century, campaigns of resistance became increasingly
intentional and strategic. It has become clear that those who lead nonviolent campaigns
need both extensive knowledge of the principles of strategic nonviolent struggle and deep
personal grounding in the local context (G. Sharp, personal communication, April 9,
2009). We suggest here that supplementing these with knowledge of behavioral systems
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science has potential for refining strategic analysis. A personal commitment to
Satyagraha or living in truth can be an important start, but a sophisticated scientific
understanding of the dynamics of individual and collective action is likely to offer
substantive help in supporting collective nonviolent struggle. At the same time, not every
activist can or should be expected to become a scientist. A next step forward, therefore, is
to extract practice principles from this science that could become part of the core
knowledge needed by those designing campaigns of nonviolent struggle (Helvey 2004),
an effort that we are currently pursuing (Mattaini, forthcoming).
Constructive noncooperation is a powerful but largely neglected area of
nonviolence practice. To be useful, much of the research required must be participatory,
conducted in partnership with those who are intimately involved in nonviolent struggle.
How might indigenously driven constructive noncooperation help in long-troubled areas
like the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in East Africa, or in the most neglected
urban areas in the U.S.? And what might “living in truth” look like for the privileged, in
an interdependent world in which the luxury enjoyed by some produces utter devastation
for many others (paraphrasing Juan Segundo, as discussed in Farmer 2003)?
We simply do not yet know the power of constructive strategies on their own or in
combination with other strategic nonviolent options, although the existing examples
appear promising. If scientific analysis can offer additional knowledge to guide
constructive action for human rights and justice, pursuing such analysis appears to be a
moral imperative.
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Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Militia Violence, Amnesty and Energy Security

Ibaba Samuel Ibaba

Abstract
This paper discusses the interface between violence in the Niger Delta, global energy
security and amnesty granted to armed groups by the Nigerian government. The author
notes the impact of the violence on energy infrastructure and brings to the fore how the
violence endangers energy security. Thus far, a major concern is that the amnesty program
will fail because it was not preceded by negotiations between the government and
combatants. The author questions this view and points outs that before the amnesty
proclamation, several negotiations through committees and commissions involving
stakeholders had been done. The paper thus argues that it cannot be entirely correct to
conclude that there were no negotiations before the amnesty program was proclaimed.
Further, it argues that the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of
government to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict. The deepening of
the country’s democracy to ensure that votes count at elections is seen as the most likely
option to guarantee the success of the amnesty program and secure the region and energy
security.

Introduction
The Niger Delta, Africa’s largest delta (World Bank 1995) and home of Nigeria’s
oil industry, has in the past two decades been characterized by protracted oil-related
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violent conflicts. The conflicts began as agitations against oil-producing companies by
oil-producing communities in the 1970s, and centered on demands for development
attention, environmental protection, and payment of adequate compensation for damages
caused by oil company activities such as oil spills. The conflict witnessed several
transformations, and this elevated the agitations to political demands (such as
restructuring of the Nigerian federation, resource ownership and self-determination) and
finally burst into full blown insurgency in 2005 (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and
Okhomina 2007; Watts 2007; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009).The literature on the Niger Delta
has shown concern for the threat the conflicts pose to energy security. One such study
concludes:
The oil based struggles for resource benefits and associated conflicts,
illegal economy and violence has raised security concerns over world oil
output, shipment and supply. Several times, the economy has led to
shortfalls in national oil production, world oil supply and consequently
sporadic increases in world oil prices. There is the fear of terrorists
attackers, latching on to the social turmoil and illegal and underground
economy to disrupt world oil supplies. There is also the fear that the
economy may afflict the West African and Gulf of Guinea oil production
and existing and potential supplies. To the United States which imports
about 17 percent of its oil needs from Sub-Saharan Africa and mainly
from Nigeria, and to whom a stable and diversified oil supply is vital to
national security, the illegal economy is a serious security concern.
(Ikelebge 2006, 49)

Although the above reference highlights the impact of the conflict on United States
energy security, just as some other studies have done (Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz 2007)
probably because the United States is the largest consumer of Nigerian oil, the implications
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are wider. The Niger Delta accounts for almost all of Nigeria’s gas and oil production
(Bassey 2010, 3) and this makes it strategic to global energy needs. It is clear that there is a
convergence of interest between securing the Niger Delta and the stability of energy needs
of several countries, including Nigeria. It is also noteworthy that energy and economic
growth are inexorably linked, and this linkage interfaces with conflict resolution and
peacebuilding.
The energy and economic threats posed by the insurgency in the Niger Delta partly
led to the Nigerian government’s amnesty program, which granted pardon to members of
militia groups (Niger Delta based non-state armed groups engaged in armed struggle
against the Nigerian State) whose attacks on oil infrastructure and disruptions in oil
production led to a drop in Nigeria’s oil production from 2.6 million barrels per day in
2005 to 1.3 million barrels per day in June 2009 (Obi 2009). The acceptance of the
amnesty program which ended on October 4, 2009, and the subsequent surrender of arms
and cessation of attacks on oil infrastructure, have witnessed a rise in oil production to 2.02
million barrels per day in December 2009 and 2.20 in April 2010 (Central Bank of Nigeria
2010).
The objective of this paper is to highlight the importance of the success of the
amnesty program to global energy security. Concerns have been raised by scholars on the
success of the amnesty program, and the major one thus far is the lack of negotiation
between ex-combatants and the state, noted to be a deviation from conventional
Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) procedure (Ikelegbe 2010;
Davidheiser and Kialee 2010; Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi 2010). But this article makes a
case that it cannot be totally correct to conclude that the amnesty policy was not preceded
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by negotiations, noting that the argument ignores the Niger Delta context. Furthermore, the
issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure to address the fundamental factors
which instigated the violence.
The remaining part of the paper is divided into 5 sections. The first, “locating the
Niger Delta conflict,” examines theoretical explanations for the conflict and highlights the
trend. The second section, “the conflict and energy security,” reflects on Nigeria’s
potential and actual strategic role in global energy needs and the implications of the
violence on energy security; while the third, “reflections on peacebuilding in the Niger
Delta,” examines efforts by the Nigerian Government towards peace in the region. The
forth section, “interrogating the amnesty program,” examines the concerns and challenges
of the amnesty program. The fifth section concludes the study by noting the centrality of
democratization to the success of the amnesty program, security of the Niger Delta and
energy security.

Locating the Niger Delta Conflict
The conflict in the Niger Delta has been linked to the oil and gas resource which
is found in the region. Over the years, the conflict has been explained from the
perspectives of greed, grievance, and frustration-aggression. The greed explanation
follows the stand point of Collier and Hoefflier (2002) who blame conflict and violence
on conflict entrepreneurs who are driven by economic gains, particularly in the face of
the availability of capturable natural resources. The grievance perspective, however,
blames violence on grievances resulting from deprivation. The three strands of the
grievance theory, relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequality (Murshed
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and Tadjoeddin 2009, 96-99) are reinforced by the psychology-based frustrationaggression theory which sees conflict as the outcome of frustration caused by the gap
between aspirations and achievements or what it refers to as “want-get-ratio,” “expected
need satisfaction” and “actual need satisfaction”(Faleti 2006, 47).
It is clearly difficult to explain the conflict in the Niger Delta from one theoretical
standpoint, given its multidimensional nature and transformations. Thus conflict analysis
in the region has witnessed an interface of interpretations by scholars in respect to the
different conflict settings or phases. Collier (2008, 31) has pointed out that the conflict in
the delta has evolved from grievance to greed in the last decade, and attributes this to
competition for the huge inflow of oil revenues by politicians and illegal payments made
by oil companies to secure production and kidnapped personnel. Watts (2007 and 2008)
agrees with this by noting the politically motivated struggles for access and control over
oil wealth and the criminalization of the conflict through oil theft or bunkering. The
commoditization of violence in the electoral process has encouraged the proliferation of
arms and cult/militia groups (Joab-Peterside 2005), a viewpoint supported by available
data which indicates the stealing of $75.1 billion by oil theft syndicates between 20032008 (Gilbert 2010, 59). Ikelegbe (2006) isolates this from the conflict and blames it on
what he describes as an “economy of conflict” created by conflict entrepreneurs who
have taken advantage of the disorder created by the violence.
Ukiwo (2008) sees this as a diversion meant to acquit the Nigerian State from the
violence, which he blames on horizontal inequalities and socio-political injustices. This
view is widespread and hinges its position on Nigeria’s centralized federalism and
ethnicity-based political domination. The explanation is that in Nigeria, national

Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1

48

Nigeria’s Niger Delta

resources and revenue is placed under the control of the federal government, which is
expected to direct it to the benefit of all the constituent units of the federation. But
because the state is ethnicized, and the custodians of power use it to pursue their ethnic
interests, the ethnic groups who are outside the control of political power are denied
equitable share of national resources. It further argues that the Nigerian State is controlled
by the major ethnic groups while oil and gas are produced in the homelands of the
minority ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta.
Thus, the oil wealth has been transferred for the benefit of the major groups, and
this explains the development plight of the Niger Delta that has motivated the conflict.
The transfer was facilitated by the reduction of the derivation component of revenue
allocation from 50 percent in 1960 to 1.5 percent in 1984. National revenues in Nigeria
are paid into a single pool called Federation Account, from where revenue is distributed
to the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local government) based on prescribed
criteria. One of these is derivation, which stipulates that a percentage of federally
collected revenue from natural resources should be paid to the states of origin. At
independence in 1960, derivation was 50 percent, but this was later reduced to 45, 20, 2
and later 1.5 percent. Protests in the Niger Delta made the government increase it; first to
3 percent, and later 13 percent (Jega 2007; Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998).
The reductions which began in 1970 coincided with the ascendance of oil as the
mainstay of the Nigerian economy (Mbanefoh and Egwaikhide 1998), which until then
relied on agricultural products based in the homelands of the majority ethnic groups. This
deprivation is linked to the grievance which is central to the conflict (Naanen 1995;
Okoko, Nna, and Ibaba 2006; Adeoye 2010). This is further linked to the paradox where
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the Niger Delta which accounts for 80 percent of government revenue and 90 percent of
foreign exchange earnings (Bassey 2010, 3) lacks development. For example, Akinola
(2010, 56) has noted that:
In spite of its strategic economic importance, the demographic picture of
the region as shown by the Human Development Index1 (HDI) is
deplorable. The HDI of the region is as low as 0.564… Average life
expectancy in the Niger Delta is 46.8 years. There is also a high mortality
of young children – of every 1000 newborn, 200 die by the age of 5.
Access to health was estimated to be available to only 56.5% of the
population and population per one hospital bed was as high as 1,277
people…. there is one doctor for every 150,000 inhabitants of the oil rich
states of Bayelsa and Delta. Similarly, educational attainment at primary
and secondary levels suffers from a high teacher-pupil ratio – 1:42,
compared with the national average of 1:36. This, invariably, resulted in a
large number of drop-outs. At the same time, unemployment is about 30%
of the available labor force in the region.

The point is that the huge oil revenues have barely benefited the population living
in poverty (United Nations Development Program 2006), thus leading to anger and
protests. The frustration-aggression theory reinforces this position. Ibaba (2007) explains
from this standpoint that dashed hopes of improved living conditions have resulted in
despair, disillusionment and pent up anger which have motivated the conflicts. But this
ethnicity-based political domination or horizontal inequality grievance perspective fails to
explain the different conflict settings adequately. For example, it does not explain the use
of violence to contest for political power among the political elites in the Niger Delta;
neither does it explain inter-community and intra-community conflicts. Also, it cannot be a
useful explanation for inter-ethnic conflicts, intra-cult/militia group and inter-cult/militia
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group conflict over contests for oil theft/bunkering space and pervasive corruption in the
region and the interface with development inadequacies and conflict. This suggests that
grievance cannot explain the totality of the conflicts in the Niger Delta, but it can be
argued that greed underlies the exclusion of the minority groups from the oil wealth by the
majority groups, as the oil wealth has not impacted the poverty of the northern region
whose political leaders have dominated governance in Nigeria. Available data shows that
despite the rule by the majority Hausa-Fulani ethnic group of northern Nigeria, and the
perception that they have used the oil wealth for the benefit of their people, the Northern
States are the poorest in the country. The 2004 poverty profile in the country listed the 6
Northern states of Jigawa, Kebbi, Kogi, Bauchi, and Kwara as the poorest. Similarly, no
Northern state was listed among the states that had the lowest incidence of poverty (Ibaba
2010, 51).
One fundamental reason advanced by Akinola (2010, 57) for deprivation of
citizens, is the domination of the public sphere by a few elites with “particularistic”
concerns that results in exclusion of the people. I agree, and note that one consequence of
this is corruption, which is possibly driven by greed. But corruption which also results in
deprivation (Ibaba and Ebiede 2008) can be a source of grievance, frustration and
aggression. Significantly, corruption is pervasive at all levels of governance in Nigeria, a
federation of 36 states and 774 local government councils. From the above, it is discernible
that the causes of conflict in the Niger Delta are multidimensional. Table 1 provides some
insight into conflict trends and conflict drivers in the region.
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Table 1: Conflict Trends in the Niger Delta Indicating the Motivating Factors and Actors
Type of Conflict
Motivating/Causal Factors
Intra-Community Conflict Triggered by disagreement
community factions over
ownership of land, and
equitable distribution of oil
industry benefits such as
scholarships, employment,
contract awards, and monies
paid as compensation for
damages
Inter-Community Conflict Caused by inter-community
struggle over benefits of the
oil industry such as award of
contracts, employment and
payment of compensation for
damage done to property.
Inter-Ethnic Conflict
This caused by inter-struggle
for over benefits of the oil
industry such as employment,
contract awards and payment
of compensation for damages,
ownership of land, title of
traditional rulers and political
appointments
Oil-Company/Community This is motivated by factors
Conflict
such as delay in the payment
of compensation for damage
to property, breach of
Memorandum of
Understanding by the oil
companies and the patronage
of community factions by the
oil companies
State-Community
This is caused by perceived
Conflict
deprivation, neglect and
exclusion from the oil wealth

Intra-cult/Militia Group
Conflict

Struggle for supremacy over
oil theft/bunkering space, and
leadership succession

Actors of Conflict
Community factions such as
youths, chiefs, urban and
local elites, engaged in a
struggle for access and
equitable share of oil
benefits

Community youths and
chiefs engaged in a struggle
for access and equitable
share of oil benefits

Community youths and
chiefs engaged in a struggle
for access and equitable
share of oil benefits and
political leaders who
manipulate the situation to
score political gains
Community youths and
chiefs engaged in a struggle
for access and equitable
share of oil benefits and
Security personnel who are
invited by the oil companies
to maintain order but get
involved due to their
excesses
Youths, chiefs, political
leaders civil society
organizations and militia
groups engaged in a struggle
for access and equitable
share of oil benefits
Youth groups engaged in
illegal oil bunkering
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Inter-Cult/Militia Group
Conflict
Political Conflict

Struggle for supremacy over
oil theft/bunkering space
Struggle for access and control
of political power

Youth groups engaged in
illegal oil bunkering
Armed political thugs,
mainly youths and
politicians who engage in a
desperate struggle for
political power due to the
personalization of the state
which encourages corruption
and accumulation of wealth

Source: Ibaba 2009, 565-566; Joab-Peteside 2005; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009, 7
The Niger Delta conflict has experienced several phases and turned towards
insurgency from 2005; resulting in the formation of numerous militia groups such as the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta People
Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV), among many others (Okonta
2006; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009, 9). The operational strategy of these groups, which had
the capacity to directly confront the Nigerian Military (Watts 2007), include attacks on oil
infrastructure, disruption of oil production, kidnapping/hostage taking of oil company
personnel and oil theft/bunkering (Ikelegbe 2006; Watts 2007; Ibaba and Ikelegbe 2009).
These actions led to a decline in oil production and disruptions/delays in the development
of oil and gas infrastructure, thus undermining energy security.

The Conflict and Energy Security
The security of energy sources in terms of production and supply is not only
important to production, but also to national security. This explains the concerns for energy
security threats, which include high oil prices, instability in exporting countries and threat
of terrorism (Yergin 2006). Thus Nigeria’s actual and potential prominent role in global
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energy needs and supplies, and the concentration of oil and gas production in the Niger
Delta, draws attention to the implications of the conflict on energy security.
Nigeria is ranked the largest oil producer in Africa (Akinola 2010, 1) and is also
noted as the 15th world oil producer, and 7th top oil exporter in the world (USEIA 2008).
Again, Nigeria exports oil to 21 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and America as shown in
Table 2.
Table 2: Percentage Export of Nigerian Oil
Country
United States of America
Canada
South Africa
Cote-d’Ivoire
Italy
Spain
France
Brazil
India
Others(Netherlands,
American Virgin Islands,
Japan, Ghana, Chile,
China, Germany,
Cameroon, South Korea,
Portugal )

Percentage Exported
42
3
3
3
4
5
6
6
13
16

Source: Nigeria, Country Briefs, 2009, p.5

Significantly, 10 of these countries, the United States, China, Japan, India, Germany,
Brazil, Canada, South Korea, France, and Italy, are among the top oil consumers in the
world (USEIA 2008). Related to this is that fact that whereas the depleted oil and gas
reserves in the North Sea of Europe stand at 15 billion barrels and 155.6 trillion cubic feet,
the reserves of Nigeria are 35 billion barrels and 185 trillion cubic feet respectively.
Further, the country’s light sweet crude is easier to refine into petrol than the crude
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produced in the Persian Gulf, Russia and Venezuela (Africa’s Oil Giant Enters Global
League www. entrepreneur.com/tradejournals).
Further, the country is ranked the 10th producer of natural gas, and the “estimated
17.2 billion cubic meter of gas it flares every year is noted to be one quarter of the power
consumption of Africa and 45 percent of the energy requirement of France, the world’s
fourth largest economy” (Onyekonwu 2008, 17). Similarly, it is estimated that the gas
flares in the Niger Delta “can provide 75 percent of the energy requirements in SubSaharan Africa, including South Africa” (Tell 2008, 84). The proposed West Africa
pipeline project is expected to convey gas from the Niger Delta to Ghana, Togo and Benin
Republic, and is expected to have a full capacity of 450 cubic meters of natural gas per
annum, on completion (Nigeria, Country Briefs, 2009, p.7).
Similarly, the Trans-Sahara gas pipeline project is designed to supply 20 billion
cubic meters of gas per annum to Europe by 2016 (Afrik-News 2010). Significantly,
Europe imports 57 percent of its gas requirements, making it the largest importer of gas.
Significantly, it is also estimated that gas consumption “would increase by 1.7 percent
annually from about 104 trillion cubic feet in 2005 to nearly 158 trillion cubic feet in
2030” (Niger Delta Standard 2009, 9). Nigeria also supplies electricity to neighbouring
African countries such as Niger, and is also involved in electricity integration projects in
the West African sub-region. One such project is the proposed 330-KV transmission line
from Lagos (Nigeria) to Togo and the Republic of Benin (Madamombe 2005).
Significantly, gas piped from the Niger Delta is a major source of electricity generation in
Nigeria. Indeed, Nigeria’s energy sources depend on the Niger Delta, as natural gas
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contributes 34 percent, and oil 58 percent. Hydro contributes a meager 8 percent (Nigeria,
Country Briefs 2009, p.2).
Attacks on gas pipelines, including six incidents between May and August 2009
alone (Daily Champion 2009, 1; Nigerian News World 2009, 16), disrupted gas supply to
the country’s electricity power plants, and the West African Pipeline Project (Adeoye
2010, 9-10). The violence also led to drastic cuts in crude oil production and export.
Available data shows that attacks on oil pipelines increased from 497 in 1999 to 895 in
2004, leading to an increase in product loss from 179,000 metric tons in 2004 to 396,000
metric tons in 2004 (Watts 2007, 639). Also the year 2006 recorded 14 militia attacks on
oil infrastructure, as well as oil company and security personnel. This increased to 23 in
2007 and 29 in 2008. These attacks led to an estimated loss of 25,200,000 barrels of crude
oil valued at $56,646,424,000 (Niger Delta Technical Committee 2008, 120-121). Also the
county’s oil exports dropped from 1.84 million barrels per day in December 2006 to 1.45
million barrels per day in October 2009, when the amnesty offer ended. The export volume
has since risen to 1.51 million and 1.57 million barrels per day in November and December
2009 respectively, and 1.76 million barrels per day in June 2010 (Central Bank of Nigeria
2010). The disruptions in oil supplies and the development of oil and gas production
infrastructure vindicate the concern shown for the threat the violence poses to energy
security. One of the intentions of the amnesty program is to address this concern.

Reflections on Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta
Before the 2009 amnesty declaration by the Nigerian government, several
attempts located at three broad levels had been made to restore peace in the Niger Delta.
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First, is development intervention by the government through the establishment of
ministerial and extra-ministerial agencies. One such attempt was the 1.5 percent
presidential committee which was established in 1982 to manage the 1.5 percent Mineral
Producing Areas Development Fund. This was succeeded by the Oil Mineral Producing
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), created in 1992, and the Niger Delta
Development Commission (NDDC) established in the year 2000. The creation of the
Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs is also part of this intervention. The mandate of these
agencies included the provision of social infrastructure and services for environmental
management, particularly in the remediation of oil spill and gas flare impacted areas
(OMPADEC 1993; Okoko, Nna, and Ibaba 2006). The neglect of the oil-producing areas
of the Niger Delta resulted in the absence of basic social infrastructure and amenities
such as health facilities, schools, electricity, and potable water. This condition was
exacerbated by oil spills and gas flare which undermined the local economies largely
based on farming and fishing. These agencies, however, had little success in addressing
these problems, and this meant that the objective conditions which motivate conflict were
sustained. The failure has been blamed on factors which include poor management of
funds, poor development planning, corruption, political interference, and inadequate
funding (Ibaba 2005; Adeyemo 2008).
At another level of analysis, the failure of these establishments to promote peace
and development is attributed to their inability to address crucial issues such as
centralized federalism, political restructuring, and reforms in revenue allocation which
are fundamental requirements for the resolution of the conflict (Tamuno 2000). Ibaba
(2009) agrees with this view but insists that they are not as important as the lack of
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democratization, which appears to have hindered the success of other aspects of the
federal government’s response to the conflict. As part of this response, the federal
government increased the derivation component of revenue allocation from 1.5 percent to
3 percent in 1992, and from 3 percent to 13 percent in 2000. These increases, which
partially met demands for increase in the derivation formula to 50 percent, improved on
the finances of the Niger Delta states. Available data shows for instance that revenue
received by the Niger Delta state from the Federation Account rose from $866.2 million
in 2000 to $7.1 billion in 2008. The data further indicates that the Niger states received
$7.1 billion out of $16.5 billion allocated to the 36 states of the federation (Ibaba 2009).
However, the increase in revenue inflow brought with it manifestations of
elements of “resource curse” such as short-sightedness of policy makers, the weakening
of state institutions through corruption, and the inhibition of democratization through
political patronage, which discourages demands for democracy and political repression
(Center for Strategic and International Studies 2008; Ross 1999). Budgetary allocations
neglect social infrastructure and social services such as education, health facilities and
potable water, whereas projects such as stadia, airports, and new lodges for political
office holders are given priority. Travel allowances are inflated, and thus consume a
substantial part of budgetary allocations. Enweremadu (2008, 448) cited the case of
Rivers State where legislators received $5.4 million as travel allowances alone in a year.
Ibaba (2009, 562) has also cited the case of Bayelsa State where over $92.8 million was
budgeted for miscellaneous expenses while $5 million was set aside for Governor’s tours
and travels in 2008. In the same year, health was allocated $84.2 million, water $3.6
million and education $78.4 million.
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Corruption and political patronage are also pervasive in the region. The Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s anti-graft agency, has accused 4 of
the 6 governors who served from 1999-2007 of financial impropriety. Chief D.S.P.
Alamieyeseigha, the first executive governor of Bayelsa State, was arrested in London in
September 2005 on money laundering charges to the tune of 1.8 million pounds (Watts
2007). He was later convicted by a Nigerian high court in 2007, after his dramatic return
from London in November 2005. The effect of corruption in the region is that only a
small proportion of the huge oil revenues have trickled down to the poor population.
Despite this, the population can hardly demand democracy and good governance, partly
because of the patron-client politics, the commoditization of violence in the electoral
process and the associated repression and electoral fraud (Joab-Peterside 2005). Election
fraud which is perpetrated through patron-client politics and violence has hijacked the
power of the people to vote out corrupt and inefficient governments. Thus the region is
denied the development and peace benefits of democracy such as the enhancement of
development and reduction of structural violence, open and fair competition for power,
provision of avenues for rational political discourse and settlement of conflicting social
interests, checks and balances of governmental powers which reduce discontent, political
participation, income re-distribution, production and funding of pubic goods, rule of law,
and accountability and transparency in governance (Ake 1996a and 1996b; McGuire and
Olson 1996; Brown and Hunter 2004; Diamond 2004; Samuels 2005; Ross 2006).
Another approach to peace which preceded the amnesty program was the 2004
cash for arms policy of the Rivers State government (one of the six state governments in
the Niger Delta), meant to retrieve arms from cults/gangs and militias. In the build up to
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the 2003 general elections, several groups were mobilized and armed by politicians to
secure election victory (Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2005; Joab-Peterside 2005). But
the events which followed created deep-seated insecurity as inter and intra cult/gang,
intra-community and inter-community conflict became frequent. The waterways became
unsafe and attacks on oil infrastructure increased. Having linked the violence to the
availability of arms, the government decided to retrieve arms from circulation. Those
who had arms were motivated with compensatory payments in cash, rehabilitation,
training, and forgiveness. The response was shocking, as a total of 1,675 assorted
firearms were submitted. These included assault rifles, AK-47 rifles, Czech SA Vz
58,HK C3, shotguns, light machine guns, Baretta 125, revolvers, craft weapons, pistols
and Czech model 26 (Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhomina 2007, 20).
Although the number of submitted arms was huge, the general feeling then was that only
an infinitesimal proportion of available arms were surrendered, just as other reports
indicated that old arms were returned to claim the monies paid, while the new arms in the
possession of the violent groups remained intact (Human Rights Watch 2005, 20).
Events which followed later tend to vindicate these claims, although it can be
argued that new arms were bought. The sources of arms in the Niger Delta, identified by
Osaghae, Ikelegbe, Olarinmoye, and Okhomina (2007, 20-21), include weapons brought
in from war-ravaged countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone by Nigerian soldiers who
had gone to those countries for peace keeping, and who then sold the arms to willing
buyers such as chiefs, politicians, and criminal gangs/cult groups; weapons exchanged for
oil by oil bunkering syndicates; weapons seized from or bought from security operatives;
and weapons brought into the country illegally by smugglers.
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This suggests that the accessibility to arms and their availability are central to the
conflict. Although information on payments for arms under the program is sketchy, one
report indicates that $2,000 was paid for each AK-47 rifle that was surrendered (Africa
News 2009). Human Rights Watch (HRW) also reported in 2005 that the Rivers State
government offered $1,800 for each assault rifle that was turned in. However, it is
estimated that arms were purchased for between $570 and $2,150, (Osaghae, Ikelegbe,
Olarinmoye, and Okhomina 2007, 19), suggesting that firearms can easily be acquired
with monies received from government in return for surrendering arms. It can be argued
from this standpoint that the arms for cash program ended up in mobilization rather than
demobilization, and this partly accounts for the high intensity of resurgence in the later
years. Further, the fundamental factors which led to the emergence of the armed groups,
such as the manipulation of youth groups by politicians, desperate struggle for traditional
political authority induced by payments to communities by oil companies, the use of
youths by oil theft/ bunkering syndicates, arms leakages, and the culture of impunity
which undermined the punishment of perpetrators of violence (HRW 2005, 4-10), were
not addressed.
It is deducible from all of the above that the failure of the government to tackle
the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict, sustained it until it was shaped by
arms to a dangerous point. Whereas the Chief Olusegun Obasanjo government was more
militaristic in its approach to the conflict, the Alhaji Musa Yari’Adua government, after
seeing the futility of that approach decided on the amnesty program after several
consultations. The amnesty proclamation which was made on June 25, 2009, came into
effect on August 6, 2009, and ended October 4, 2009, offered forgiveness to militants in
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return for withdrawal from the creeks, arms surrender, re-integration and provision of
source of livelihood (Adeyemi-Suenu and Inokoba 2010, 8). Unlike the cash for arms
program of the Rivers State government, the amnesty program made provisions for those
who accepted the pardon to be registered and camped for training, rehabilitation and
reintegration. In addition, they were paid allowances to provide for their feeding and
other needs. The government budgeted $63 million for this (Africa News 2009). At the
end of the amnesty period, the amnesty implementation committee reported the surrender
of about 15,000 militants, 2,760 assorted arms and 287, 445 variety of ammunitions (The
Nation 2009). Since the end of the amnesty, attacks on oil infrastructure and oil company
personnel are almost non-existent while oil production in the region has become
reasonably stable.

Interrogating the Amnesty Program
The amnesty program has been criticized on a number of grounds. The most
prominent is the contention that it did not follow disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) procedures. One such critique has noted:
DDR is typically adopted in post conflict societies, where peace
agreements have been forged among ex-combatants who have signified a
willingness to return to civil life. Interestingly, Nigeria offers an exception
from the standard approach. … The conceptualization of amnesty
underlies the structure of pre-amnesty peace negotiations, and ultimately
defines the strategy of disarmament and the design of post-amnesty
demobilization. It shows that the conception of amnesty as a “gift handed
down to militants perceived primarily as criminals” is the major challenge
to the amnesty initiative. This is evident in the non-inclusion of a specific
strategy for addressing the roots of militancy in the amnesty program. This
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suggests that the amnesty initiative does not differ markedly from the
state’s preferred peace strategy of win/lose, which has underscored
constant agitations, and the evolving dynamics of complex insurgency in
the region. (Davidheiser and Kialee 2010, 1)

The above reference emphasizes the absence of pre-amnesty negotiations and the
signing of a peace agreement with the ex-militants as a major flaw that may truncate the
program. The contention is that negotiations with the ex-combatants were necessary to
define a comprehensive peace agreement which would serve as a framework for the
implementation of the amnesty program. Adeyemo and Olu-Adeyemi (2010) and
Ikelegbe (2010) agree with this, and note that the absence of negotiation has created a
vacuum described as “the lack of participation and sense of ownership of the program by
ex-combatants” (Davidheiser and Kialee 2010, 13). This is seen as a major threat to the
program. However, it cannot be completely correct to conclude that there were no
negotiations before the amnesty was proclaimed. Whereas negotiation is conventional in
DDR, it would be wrong to ignore context when insisting on its application.
Although the insurgency in the Niger Delta has been championed by several
groups, their demands have been congruent as evidenced in the petitions made to the
federal government by the different ethnic nationalities. The Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990),
the Aklaka Declaration (1999), Bill of Rights of the Oron People (1999), Resolutions of
the First Urhobo Economi Summit (1998) the Warri Accord (1999), and The Kaima
Declaration (1998) are all unanimous on the demands for resource control, selfdetermination, increase in derivation, and environmental protection as remedies and
strategies for the development of the region. Essentially, the lack of development is the
prime motive for the agitations which turned violent. Further, numerous commissions of
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inquiry and committees have been established to investigate the issues and recommend
policy options. The work of these commissions and committees has been done by
stakeholders and in consultation with stakeholders, and in many cases, decisions were
reached by consensus.
In September 2008, the federal government constituted the Niger Delta Technical
Committee (NDTC) to review all past reports on the region, including the report of the
Willinks Commission established by the colonial government in 1957. The NDTC was
given the mandate to determine policy options that can “help the government to achieve
sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta.”
The NDTC submitted its report in November 2008, and made recommendations which
center on governance and rule of law (disarmament, decommission, reintegration,
reforms in governance and institutions), regional development (transportation, water and
power, economic development, reclamation, environment and sustainable development),
and compact with stakeholders. Two things are noteworthy here. First, amnesty was a key
recommendation of the NDTC. Second, the recommendations of the NDTC were based
on the reports of previous committees and commissions (such as the Belgore Report
1992; the Etiebet Report 1994; the Poopola Report 1998; the Ogomudia Report 2001; the
Presidential Panel on National Security 2003; the National Political Reform Conference
Report 2005; and the Report of the Presidential Council on the Social and Economic
Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta 2006) and the different petitions of
the various ethnic nationalities of the region, and thus, it was unanimously accepted in the
Niger Delta as the road map to peace and development in the region.
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Given this, I argue that the issue of negotiation is not as important as the failure to
address the fundamental issue of development neglect which triggered and sustained the
conflict. Importantly, the promise by the federal government to address the development
of the region and related issues ensured the acceptance of the amnesty by the armed
groups. Thus the government has only implemented one aspect of the Committee’s
recommendations which emerged by consensus. The implementation of the other policy
recommendations will most likely prevent the resurgence of violence in the region and
thus secure energy needs and supply.
This view is predicated on addressing the challenges posed by the lack of
democratization and capacity on the part of the political leadership to pursue the common
good. Corruption, the lack of transparency and accountability in governance, the
desperate struggle for political power, commoditization of violence in the electoral
process, political repression and the neglect of development, which have contributed to
the conflict, are consequences of the lack of democracy and good governance. This is
also true of ethnicity-based political domination and irresponsive governance. The
Willinks Commission Report (1958, 30) made this point when it noted that “the best
protection for a remote territory against governmental neglect or discrimination is the
voting power of its inhabitants…the development of democratic institutions… can
strengthen this safeguard.” Election rigging, which makes votes not to count, has robbed
the country and the Niger Delta of these benefits. Significantly, election rigging has
become an integral part of the Nigerian electoral process (Alapiki 1995; Ibrahim 2006;
Bratton 2008).
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One concern for the amnesty program is speculation that militia groups withheld
some of their firearms, thus making the region prone to the resurgence of violence. But
even if this speculation is true (as the assassination of Soboma George, former militant
commander in Rivers State, on August 24, 2010 and the October 1, 2010 Abuja bomb
blasts suggest), the use of the arms can only be encouraged by undemocratic conditions.
The crisis plaguing the national economy is also a major challenge to the success of the
amnesty program. Corruption and the associated poor management of funds and
resources, the energy and infrastructure crisis, and the global economic recession have
knocked down the Nigerian economy. The country generates only 3.7 megawatts of about
20,000 megawatts of its electricity needs, imports refined petroleum products even
though it is OPEC’s 6th largest producer, the poverty rate is over 70 percent, and youth
unemployment is about 49 percent (Channels Television 2010).
This condition threatens the success of the education, training and rehabilitation
components of the amnesty. The question is, Will the educated, trained and rehabilitated
militants operate in a different economy? The answer is obviously no, and herein lies the
problem. The lack of employment for these repentant militants may incite them to
violence. Further, the high youth unemployment put at 49 percent (Channels Television
2010) indicates that there are several other youths who may be prone to violence.
Significantly, present policies are not addressing this effectively, just as the education,
training, and rehabilitation components of the amnesty program have thus far neglected
the youths who did not carry arms against the state. This tends to create a perception that
it pays to be violent, and may instigate further violence if not attended to. It is proper to
argue here that the economic crisis may have created a “frustration-aggression trap” that
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tends towards a cycle of violence. Escaping this trap is therefore essential for the success
of the amnesty program.
In an earlier section, the paper noted the application of the greed and grievance
explanation of violence to the Niger Delta conflict. The discussion here underscores the
relevance of these theories in the analysis of the Niger Delta conflict, and draws attention
to the fact that the resolution of greed and grievance is central to peace building in the
region.

Conclusion
This paper examined the interface between militia violence in Nigeria’s Niger
Delta, the amnesty granted the armed groups by the Nigerian government, and energy
security. The objective of the paper was to highlight the importance of the success of the
amnesty program to global energy security. The study reviewed the theoretical
explanations of the conflict and noted that a single theory can hardly explain the different
settings of conflicts in the region. Thus the paper emphasized the integration of the greed,
grievance and frustration-aggression theories that have dominated conflict analysis in the
Delta. Thus the variations of conflict such as oil company-community conflict, intracommunity conflict, inter-community conflict, community-state conflict, intra-cult/gangs
and militia conflict and inter-cults/gangs and militia conflicts were located in these
contexts, and the analysis highlighted the resolution of greed and grievances as a major
requirement for peacebuilding in the area.
Nigeria’s strategic role in global energy needs was discussed, and Nigeria’s
potential and actual importance to gas needs in Europe and Africa, the countries supply of
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crude oil to 21 countries in Europe, America, Asia and Africa, and electricity supplies to
some African countries were emphasized. The paper reflected the impact of the violence
on energy infrastructure and brought to the fore how the violence endangers energy
security. The disruptions of gas supplies to energy plants in Nigeria and the West African
gas pipeline and the drastic cuts in oil production and exports were cited as examples of
the implications of the violence for energy security.
The amnesty program was initiated to restore peace and ensure unfettered oil and
gas production in the region. It set out to retrieve arms from the creeks of the region,
provide means of livelihood and forgiveness to individuals who took up arms against the
state and attacked and destroyed energy infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines. The 60
day amnesty which ended on October 4, 2009, has brought relative peace to the region as
evidenced by the near absence of attacks on oil and gas production infrastructure and
kidnapping/hostage taking of oil company personnel, and increase in oil production and
export. But the program has been criticized for not adhering to the principles of DDR,
particularly for not being preceded by a negotiation framework. This is seen as a vacuum
that can undermine its success. While I agree with this, I make a case that the argument
ignores the Niger Delta context. My contention is that it cannot be entirely correct to
conclude that there were no negotiations before the amnesty program was proclaimed by
the federal government.
The point is that before the amnesty was proclaimed, several negotiations through
committees and commissions involving stakeholders had been done. Further, the different
nationalities had documented petitions to the federal government. Meanwhile, the
recommendations of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, which included the amnesty
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program and which was widely accepted as a road map to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the region, consulted and reflected issues raised in the committees and
commissions which preceded it, in addition to the petitions of the ethnic nationalities.
Given this, the issue of negotiation cannot be as important as the failure of the government
to tackle the fundamental issues which triggered the conflict. The lack of democratization,
lack of capacity of political leaders to pursue public good, and the crisis plaguing the
national economy are challenges to the success of the amnesty program. To enhance the
success of the amnesty program and secure the region and energy security, the deepening
of democratic practice to ensure that votes count in Nigerian elections is the most likely
way out of the conflict.
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Abstract
The Bush Doctrine, which was installed after the 9-11 attacks on the United States under
the guise of the war on terrorism, postulated a vision of the United States as the world’s
unchallenged superpower and the invasion of Iraq became one of the central fronts of
this war. After failing to get approval by the United Nations for the invasion, the Bush
Administration’s attempt to assemble a coalition of the willing became critical to the
battle for public opinion to back the war. While the administration was able to garner
some support, the coalition eventually unravelled and all troops are expected to depart
by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a failure of U.S. foreign policy. This article
discusses how different strands of social movement theory, including resource
mobilization and the political process model, can be combined to examine how the
coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United
States to sustain support for the Iraq war. It contributes to the literature on social
movements by assessing the ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization
efforts are often interconnected in order to explain both the how and the why of social
movements, usually treated separately in much of the extant research.

The National Security Strategy document, or the “Bush Doctrine,” which was
installed after the 9-ll attacks on the United States postulated a vision of the United States
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as the world’s unchallenged superpower. It defended the preemptive use of U.S. military
power, refusal of the United States to be bound by any international treaty or
organization, the ability to violate international laws and disregard international
institutions such as the United Nations (UN) when expedient to do so, and explicitly
linked U.S. economic and military policy (Peter 2007). Critics charge that it served to
accelerate the process of imperial globalization in the name of providing security to U.S.
citizens and its allies under the guise of the “war on terrorism” (Gitlin 2005). The war on
terrorism, as spelled out by the Bush administration, is defined as the military, political,
and legal actions in response to 9-11 with the objective of countering terrorist threats,
preventing terrorist acts, and curbing the influence of terrorist organizations
(whitehouse.gov).
Former President Bush consistently referred to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as one of
the central fronts in the war on terrorism (Peter 2007). After failing to get approval by
the United Nations (UN) for the invasion, the administration’s attempt to assemble a
“coalition of the willing” became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war.
Shortly before the Iraq war began the U.S. government announced that nearly forty
countries had joined the coalition. However, only four contributed troops—Britain,
Poland, Australia and Denmark, and more than 95% of the committed combat troops
were American or British (Ripley 2008).
Key countries on the UN Security Council, most notably France and Russia, did
not support the coalition from the onset, and as the conflict dragged on politicians and
citizens in countries that originally supported the invasion began to question the war and
dropped out of the coalition. As global networks of individuals pressured their
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governments to cooperate in a coalition of the unwilling, the coalition eventually
unravelled and all combat troops are scheduled to leave Iraq by 2011 in what is perceived
by many as a defeat for the United States (Farrell 2008). Consequently, this raises
questions regarding the ability of the United States to operate unilaterally in the future,
and what factors were responsible for the demise of the coalition. In the past the United
States’ success as sole superpower depended on a system of alliances with other powers
and a division among those who would challenge it (Owens 2006). However, this has
been altered on two fronts. First, at the core of the Bush Doctrine is the replacement of
international cooperation with a world order based on direct U.S. assertion that it will act
alone if necessary. Second, there emerged a collective opposition to the U.S. invasion
even among former allies as public opinion increasingly turned against participation in
the war on terrorism.
This article discusses how different aspects of social movement theory can be
combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had
on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. Resource
mobilization and framing theories can explain how the contemporary peace movement
forged a sense of transnational collective identity as groups organized to utilize resources
and attempted to influence public authorities through contentious politics. Other theories
that employ the political process model, and the focus on political opportunity structures
(POS) in particular, illustrate that the collapse of the coalition was also due in part to a
“revolution at the ballot box.” The political process framework draws attention to the
importance of working within the formal arena of institutional and electoral politics. Its
emphasis on potential shifts in governance discourse, which allow activists to question
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states’ legitimacy and manipulate competition between political elites, helps to clarify
why mobilizations emerge. Incorporating both resource mobilization and political
process theories further illuminates how activists and politicians took advantage of the
process of blowback—the unintended consequences that resulted in their countries due to
their governments’ support of the U.S. mission. I argue that neither resource
mobilization nor structural theories on their own can sufficiently explain the demise of
the coalition and ultimate defeat of the United States’ efforts in Iraq. This analysis
contributes to the literature on social movements, much of which relies on a particular
theory that focuses exclusively on either the how or the why of social movements, by
assessing the complex ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization efforts are
interconnected.

Social Movement Theory
One central component of social movement theory is resource mobilization. This
branch examines the tactical and strategic repertoires that activists use in specific
campaigns as well as organizational dynamics, leadership, resource management, and the
construction and legitimation of collective identities (Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy,
and Zald 1996). Collective identity refers to the association of the goals and values of a
movement with one’s own, and these can be a perception of a shared status or
relationship rather than an exclusively concrete one (Polleta and Jasper 2001). Key to
forging collective identity is how organizers “frame” their issues to resonate with
potential recruits and they do this by linking participants’ grievances to mainstream
beliefs and values (Snow and Benford 1992). Framing thus helps explain the articulation
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of grievances, the dynamics of recruitment and mobilization, and the maintenance of
solidarity and collective identity. Frames are influential when organizers persuade large
numbers of people that the issues they care about are urgent, that alternatives are
possible, that there is a worthiness (or moral standing) of the activists’ demands, and that
the constituencies they seek to mobilize can be invested with agency (Tarrow and Tilly
2006; Cress and Snow 2000). For a frame to go from understanding to motivating action
it must have the elements of injustice, identity, and agency (Gamson 1992).
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work describes types of global mobilizing strategies as
Transnational Activist Networks (TANs). TANs emerge when social movement actors
form alliances and coalitions with activists outside of their state to put pressure on their
governments when they are unresponsive to their demands. These have been effective in
the global solidarity network for the Zapatista struggle in Mexico (see Olsen 2006);
indigenous struggles against the Guatemalan government for its involvement in the
slaughter of thousands Guatemala citizens during the civil war of the 1980s (see Stewart
2006); and in the labor organizing efforts in the maquila industry in Mexico (see Carty
2006).
Such networks demonstrate how movements with transnational ties can help
cultivate movement identities, shape new activist frames, transcend nationally defined
interests, and build solidarity with a global emphasis. Though these networks are flexible
and are made up of various coalitions that often work on different issues, the main bond
between them is that they maintain similar values and visions. One of the primary goals
of TANs is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms (Khagram
and Sikkink 2002). These international norms are sometimes part of the resources social
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movement actors use to draw in new recruits and to develop their collective beliefs, as
appealing to pre-existing international norms helps to legitimate local grievances.
Another goal of TANs is to transform their collective beliefs into new international
norms by using persuasion and moral pressure to change institutions and governments
(Khagram and Sikkink 2002).
One of the most common repertoires for the peace movement has been utilizing
local and international networking in the form of street protests and rallies. Though
single protests rarely have direct or immediate results, they are effective in a number of
other ways. For example, they serve the function of dramatizing the legitimacy, unity,
numbers, and commitment of groups supporting the social movement goals (Tilly 2004;
McAdam et al. 2001). They also help to consolidate activist identities among new
recruits and long-term members by dramatizing conflict and creating “us-versus-them”
identities as they develop an oppositional consciousness (McAdam 1996).
While resource mobilization can explain the how of social movements, Touraine
(1985) notes some of the shortcomings due to the neglect of the why. Most notably he
argues that this framework tends to overlook structural problems and define actors by
their strategies and not by the social relationships, especially the power relationships in
which these actors are involved. It also pays little attention to hegemonic forms of power
and the multiplication of points of antagonism. Additionally, the ability of social
movement activists to engage successfully in contentious politics relies to a large extent
on political opportunity structures (POS). These are defined by Tarrow (2001) and
Gamson and Meyer (1996) as institutional initiatives in the form of a shift in governance
configurations toward more openness or closure of institutions and policy arenas, and/or
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a shift in governance culture or discourses. In other words, they refer to the perception of
what are legitimate forms of social engagement in a certain political context at a certain
point in time when institutional politics appear to be unresponsive to activists’ concerns.
Another major factor that can enhance the potency of collective action is a division
among those that the challengers are opposed to because this allows them to manipulate
the competition between political elites (Meyer and Staggenborg 1998; Jenkins and
Perrow 1977).
Following up on this contention, Smith (2002) and Keck and Sikkink (1998)
suggest that states can become more vulnerable to activists when they are divided
because it creates new spaces in which to question state agendas and create alliances with
powerful actors outside the domestic political arena. Therefore, states can at times serve
as movement allies on particular issues or promote their strategic interests by aligning
themselves with movement opposition to other governments’ polices. Though these may
only be small steps in the larger struggle, as Keck and Sikkink’s findings support, when
activists effectively shape individual state decisions international campaigns have a better
chance of changing international policy. These dynamics further underpin the work of
Marks and McAdam (1996) who argue that while nation-states remain a focus,
challengers face an emerging system of multi-level governance, whereby the relations
among states become resources or obstacles to movement goals.

The Contemporary Peace Movement and Contentious Politics
The war on terrorism has sparked a re-emergence of the peace movement on an
international scale. Clearly, this movement is incredibly diverse and ranges from groups
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1
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that are strictly anti-war (United for Peace and Justice, Win Without War, Vote Vets,
Military Families Speak Out, Bring Them Home Now, Stop the War Coalition, and
Peaceful Tomorrows) to others that advocate for a variety of social justice issues
(ANWSER, Code Pink, Global Exchange, Global Justice Movement, and MoveOn).
Each of these groups will be discussed in more detail below. The first major protests
organized immediately after 9-11 were sponsored by ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War
and End Racism) which is one of the largest U.S.-based transnational peace
organizations, and were held in San Francisco and Washington D.C. (Simonson 2003).
UFPJ’s (United for Peace and Justice), another leading U.S.-based and transnational
peace organization was established one year later in response to certain frustrations with
ANSWER. While initially the two groups held joint protests and rallies, because of
disputes over issues of framing and agenda the two had a very public split and currently
hold separate events (for a full description of the discrepancies between the two
organizations see Coy, Wohrle and Maney 2005). In terms of leadership, organizational
dynamics, and utilization of resources this has been a hindrance to the peace movement
within the United States, but international momentum and activism in other countries has
helped to sustain the overall mobilization.
Globally, between January 3rd and April 12th of 2003 thirty-six million people
across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against the war in Iraq (Callincos
2005). The power of protest mobilization was most clearly evident on February 15,
2003, when the world experienced the largest international mobilization for peace ever.
This was coordinated simultaneously in seventy-five countries with estimates ranging as
high as fifteen million people across all six continents (bbc.com 2003). One of the
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largest gatherings took place in London, where over two million people protested in Hyde
Park alone (Bowley 2004). In Germany 500,000 protested, 300,000 rallied across
France, and tens of thousands demonstrated in Melbourne; the largest peace march the
city had witnessed since the Vietnam War (cnn.com). The international protest was one
of a series of demonstrations organized by UK-based Stop the War coalition (the UK’s
largest antiwar organization which serves as an umbrella organization that networks with
dozens of other peace, labor, Muslim and other groups) before and after the invasion of
Iraq.
This international mobilization demonstrated the efficacy of global solidarity
through grassroots protest as thousands of independent yet interconnected groups
organized to challenge U.S. foreign policy as well as the role of their own governments in
supporting the war. As resource mobilization theory suggests, through massive
demonstrations activists dramatized the legitimacy of the cause and fostered a sense of
solidarity and collective identity that served to enhance the commitment to a singular
vision of impeding the invasion. In its aftermath, former assistant secretary general of the
United Nations, Robert Muller stated, “Now there are two superpowers: the United States
and the merging voice of the people of the world. All around the world, people are
waging peace” (Hoge 2004). Also following the protest the New York Times described
the global peace movement as “the world’s second superpower,” and it was immediately
after this global demonstration that the governments of nine countries backed out of the
coalition of the willing (New York Times 2003).
After the February 15th demonstrations other numerous events and coordinated
actions took place to capitalize on the momentum of the protest. On the 16th of February
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an estimated 400,000 protested in Milan and more than 300,000 took the streets in
Barcelona in response to the governments’ participation in the coalition of the willing
(New York Times 2003). On that same day more than 6,000 candlelight vigils for peace
were held in more than 100 countries (MoveOn.org 2003). Protests against state visits by
President Bush also drew thousands to the streets globally. In November of 2003,
200,000 people protested in Trafalgar Square when President Bush made a state visit to
the United Kingdom (Agence French Press 2004). When he visited Ireland in 2005,
50,000 citizens protested the use of Shannon Airport as a stopover point for U.S. troops
bound for Iraq (Organization Trends 2005). When Bush left Shannon for Turkey and
then later traveled to Canada he encountered similar scenes of hostility. Some of the
most popular signs at protests that questioned the motive for the invasion and displayed
resentment toward Bush included slogans such as, “Drop Bush Not Bombs,” and
“Regime Change Begins at Home” (Agence French Press 2004). Ultimately, the target
of these protests was the Bush Doctrine and in particular the concept of preemptive war.
Many other activist organizations mobilized via the Internet as the numerous
antiwar protests, speaking tours, vigils, and teach-ins were arranged primarily through
cyberspace (Carty and Onyette 2006). Online activist groups such as Peaceful
Tomorrows, Bring Them Home Now, Military Families Speak Out, and VoteVets are
specifically comprised of military families, veterans, active duty personnel, and reservists
and are organized mainly through wired networks. While traditional resource
mobilization theories have analyzed mobilization efforts based on face-to-face contact,
contemporary social movements such as the peace movement call for an expansion of
these analyses to demonstrate how, through cyberactivism, individuals and coalitions can
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foster a sense of collective identity and solidarity using new information communication
technologies. Similar to traditional forms of collective action, what brings activists
together in the virtual world is a shared sense of urgency, and though originally forged
online these relationships often spill over into face-to-face interaction in the form of
contentious politics (Carty 2009). In terms of framing, the online mission statements of
each of these groups reflect a demand for justice in accordance with the principles of
international law, opposition to the doctrine of unilateral military preemption, and
promotion of U.S. foreign policy that places a high priority on internationally recognized
principles of human rights, democracy, and self-rule. Similar to the rhetoric present at
UFPJ-sponsored demonstrations of “Let the Inspections Work,” these groups view
international institutions such as the UN as pertinent to securing peace (Coy, Woehrel
and Manye 2005).
Win Without War (a coalition of dozens of national organizations opposed to the
invasion of Iraq) and MoveOn.Org (which works on a number of progressive campaigns
and one of the foremost issues of peace) are exclusively online organizations, and the two
held one of the most prominent acts of online civil disobedience in the form of a virtual
march to protest the imminent invasion of Iraq. Using email connections to coordinate
and organize a protestor base, one month before the U.S. invasion 200,000 individuals
signed up and made more than 400,000 phone calls and sent 100,000 faxes to every
senate office in the United States with the message: DON’T ATTACK IRAQ!
(withwithoutwar.org). It was also MoveOn that organized the thousands of vigils across
the globe on the 16th of February before the March invasion. This again demonstrates
how cyberactivism and contentious politics in the material world often spill over into

Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1

89

The Coalition of the Unwilling

communities in material forms of action. The framing that both organizations employ
also supports the policy of following international law and working in synch with global
institutions. It further questions the notion of terrorism itself.
For example, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan MoveOn sent an online petition
to congress stating, “If we retaliate by bombing Kabul and kill people oppressed by the
Taliban, we become like the terrorists we oppose” (MoveOn.org). Once the invasion of
Iraq was underway it organized a massive transnational email drive to enlist signatures
for a citizens’ declaration which was delivered to the UN Security Council that read: “As
a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq begins, we the undersigned citizens of many countries
reaffirm our commitment to addressing international conflicts through the rule of law and
the United Nations. We pledge to redouble our efforts to put an end to the Bush
Administration’s doctrine of preemptive attack and the reckless use of military power”
(MoveOn.org). This was also displayed in a full-page ad in the New York Times.
In sum, the framing used by UFPJ, Win Without War, MoveOn and other sectors
of the peace movement in the forms of signs, slogans, petitions, mission statements, and
advertisements in newspapers incorporate a sense of injustice, identity and agency. By
framing their concerns in moral and ethical terms through forms of contentious politics
these groups questioned the validity of the claims for the retaliation for the events of 9-11
and the invasion of Iraq, exposed the contradictions of government officials ignoring
international norms, and subsequently challenged the framing of the issues by those
promoting the war. They also problematized the notion of terrorism itself by equating
retaliation against Afghanistan and Iraq as acts of terror. For these organizations
international cooperation, global norms, and international institutions such as the UN
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figure centrally in their vision of a preferred world order. As Keck and Sikkink (1998)
suggest, one of the primary goals of TANs is to frame their concerns in a way that
petitions for the strengthening, implementation, and monitoring of international norms,
and certain segments of the peace movement clearly mobilized to achieve this. Through
contentious politics they sought to influence public opinion and alter the discourse of the
debate by questioning the notion of preemptive war under the rubric of the war on
terrorism, and pressured governments to act on moral principles that adhere to
international standards of justice.
Relatedly, activists were also able to tap into mainstream beliefs and values to
gain support by appealing to the moral worthiness of their grievances, which as Snow and
Benford (1992) argue is critical for social movements. Both within the United States and
abroad, leading up to the conflict public opinion supported letting the inspections work
and/or UN approval before the United States and its partners in the coalition invaded
Iraq. For example, a poll conducted by the New York Times and CBS News showed that
two out of three respondents in the United States wanted the government to wait for the
UN inspections to end before it invaded, and only 31% supported using military force
immediately (cbsnews.org). Internationally, in most countries, including those that were
most closely aligned with the United States, over 70% of the public opposed U.S.
military action against Iraq without UN approval (Pew Research Center 2003). With
such strong international opposition to the war activists were able to appeal to third
parties by tapping into these common sentiments.
On the other hand, TANs sometimes use framing to try to transform their
collective beliefs into new international norms by using persuasion and moral pressure to
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change, rather than appeal to, institutions, laws or governments, as noted by Khagram
and Sikkink (2002). ANSWER and its member groups are more supportive of this
approach. Some of the most popular slogans at its rallies and demonstrations are “No
Blood for Oil,” “End all Occupations Now” and “Who’s the Biggest Terrorist in the
World Today – Bush, Cheney and the CIA” (ANSWER.org). This framing indicates an
attitude that opposes imperialism, highlights the link between militarism and capitalism,
and similar to MoveOn’s petition question how governments framed the concept of
terrorism. As opposed to other organizations in the struggle for peace, ANSWER
perceives international law to be a codification of the dominant capitalist states with no
popular democratic source, and it is viewed as a creation United States’ national interest
in particular (ANSWER.org). Thus, through transnational mobilizing it seeks to establish
a new world order that bypasses the present international institutions in the hopes of
creating new ones that are more democratic.
This framing of linking militarism to capitalism and superpowers invading weaker
nations for imperialist reasons can be traced back to Lenin in the early twentieth century.
He argued that because capitalism must always acquire new markets, new sources of raw
materials, and new outlets for investment ultimately results in market competition that
pushes the world superpowers try to rearrange who owns and/or controls what in terms of
goods, markets and geopolitical influence (1916). This ideology has been manifest
throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy. For example, after WWI Woodrow Wilson
stated, “Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having
the world as a market, the flag of this nation must follow him, and the doors of the
nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by
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financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling
nations be outraged in the process” (Williams 1972). Several decades later the “Clinton
Doctrine” during the 1990s dictated that Washington had the right to use military force to
defend vital interests such as “ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy
supplies and strategic resources” (Klare 2004).
Summarizing the link between war and the pursuit of profit, social critic and
journalist for the New York Times, Thomas Friedman (2005), elaborates
The hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist.
McDonalds cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas. The hidden first
that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies to flourish is
called the U.S. army, air force, navy and Marine Corp. (p.36).

Though the fist is no longer hidden, the framing used by ANSWER signifies the
necessity of war for capitalism to sustain itself and particularly with its “no blood for oil”
rhetoric. It views the war on terrorism as a justification for controlling markets and for
U.S.-based corporations to profit in the name of securing U.S. citizens. This framing
process differs from other segments of the peace movement that endorse more of a
globalist perspective. Its Marxist orientation, focus on the United States as empire, and
rejection of international institutions and international law as fair arbiters of justice set it
apart from other actors. However, despite the friction between UFPJ and ANSWER
there is consensus among the various international factions of the peace movement that
the United States is an occupying force that must leave Iraq and allow Iraqis to establish
their own form of self-governance.
As numerous and large as they were, mobilization efforts in the form of
contentious politics by themselves were insufficient in preventing the war against Iraq
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1
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and failed to deter several governments from joining the coalition of the willing. Despite
demands for restraint through the vast global networks of activists, the Bush
Administration invaded Iraq without UN approval, thus disregarding both international
law and public opinion. In response to the global protests President Bush stated he would
not base policy on the opinions of a “focus group” (Stevenson 2003). In addition, some
of the most prominent nations that joined the United Sates—Britain, Spain, Italy and
Australia—also went against the demands of the majority of their citizens. Thus, while
resource mobilization theory is helpful in explaining how the mobilization emerged, the
various tactics and strategies it used, and how a shared sense of collective identity was
established, on its own it cannot adequately explain how the peace movement was
ultimately able to affect state decisions regarding whether or not to join, and later remain
in or drop out of the coalition. Therefore, social movement theories that focus on
institutional politics such as the political process framework are a necessary
accompaniment because they explore how activists can use leverage at the ballot box,
manipulate divisions among elites, and take advantage of phenomena such as blowback
to force their opponents to address their demands.

The Political Process Model, POS and the Revolution at the Ballot Box
Political process theory can help refine our understanding of why the mobilization
was eventually successful by focusing on structural dynamics that include hegemonic
forms of power and the various and sometimes interconnected of points of antagonism as
suggested by Touraine (1985). Also, as Tarrow (2001) contends, a shift in governance
discourse can assist activists in their ability to alter the debate and consequently open up
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spaces for them to make demands on their governments. This oftentimes occurs when
there is a division of political elites either on an international or domestic scale, and this
proved to be essential to the development of the coalition of the unwilling.
President Bush’s inability to garner international support from key members of
the Security Council and other powerful nations to form a credible coalition of the willing
resulted in a conflict between political leaders; some significant allies initially and
vocally declined and most others eventually rescinded after originally agreeing to
participate. From the onset key Security Council members including France, Germany,
China, and Russia all demanded that the UN inspectors be given more time to locate the
alleged weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the United States, Britain, and
Spain claimed that the Iraqi government was not cooperating and that an immediate
assault was therefore justified (cnn.com). While there was wide support for the U.S.
attack on Afghanistan two years earlier, this was in large part due to the sympathy the
United States enjoyed given the magnitude of the 9-11 attacks. However, the original
outpouring of sympathy quickly faded as many close allies became alienated due to the
indignation that the Bush Administration displayed toward nations that were questioning
its foreign policy on the issue of Iraq. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld referred to France and Germany as the “old” Europe when they refused to
participate in the coalition, and in retaliation for Germany’s reluctance to support the
invasion Bush threatened to withdraw U.S. military bases from the region. Both
Germany and France were also threatened with the loss of U.S. contracts for defenserelated goods and services (Aguera 2003). And Bush’s statements regarding the United
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Nations as “irrelevant” when it refused to authorize the war obviously led to a division
between the Bush Administration and the leaders of other powerful nations.
Among the countries that did participate in the coalition, almost all went against
the will of their citizens (Bowley 2004). Whether their decisions were based on genuine
support for U.S. policies, on fear of possible retaliation following President Bush’s
statement in a post 9-11 press conference that you are “either with us or with the
terrorists,” or on individual state decisions to pursue their own military, economic, and/or
political interests are critical questions to explore. For example, the Institute for Policy
Studies (IPS) compiled an analysis of the thirty-four nations that publicly supported the
United States and found that most were recruited through coercion, bullying, and bribery
(ips-de.org). It exposed that some countries were trying to get into NATO at the time
(Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia,
and Slovenia) and of course were cognizant of the fact that the United States can veto
nations vying for membership. Also, many new European countries that signed on were
former Warsaw Pac nations which have historically viewed the United States as their key
post Cold War international protector (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Georgia). And finally, some nations were receiving foreign aid from the United States
and had to consider opportunities for trade and investment on the one hand, or the threat
of sanctions on the other (Mexico, Turkey, Costa Rica, and the Philippines). The United
States has a long history of retaliating against countries that vote against its interests.
One of the most blatant examples was when Yemen, the sole Arab country on the
Council, voted against the resolution authorizing the 1991 Gulf War. A U.S. diplomat
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told the Yemeni ambassador, “that will be the most expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast.”
Three days later the United States cut its entire aid budget to Yemen (Bennis 2003).
This coercion substantiates ANSWER’s perception of the UN as dominated by
the United States and its argument that such international institutions do not always
operate on the basis of neutrality. The IPS analysis further noted that although the United
States has used bribes and threats to manipulate the UN in the past, the scale of the
pressure was new because governments faced such massive opposition at home.
Therefore, the mobilization efforts by citizens in the countries that joined the coalition
were variables that elected officials had to at least consider when deciding whether or not
to participate. However, these were weighed against political and economic
ramifications given their standing vis-à-vis the United States. This highlights the
significance of Tourrain’s (1985) contention that activists cannot only be defined by their
strategies, but also by the power relations in which they are involved. In many cases
public opinion was secondary to governments’ decisions to align themselves with the
world’s sole superpower. These dynamics also illustrate the various points of antagonism
that social movements often face, especially when dealing with international issues and
systems of multi-level governance, which, as suggested by Marks and McAdam (1996),
allow for relations among states to become resources or obstacles to movement goals.
Clearly, the position of those countries that abstained from supporting the United States
for various reasons strengthened the efforts of the peace movement, while those that
disregarded public opinion and participated in the invasion impeded the activists’ efforts.
Though dozens of countries decided to back Bush in the war on terrorism initially,
many of these were eventually pressured to back out or experienced regime change of
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their own. Some of the staunchest allies, Britain’s Tony Blair, Italy’s Duce Silvio
Berlusconi, Spain’s Jose Maria Anzar, Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and Australia’s
John Howard all suffered losses in elections following their decision to back the Bush
Doctrine. As Smith (2002) argues, divisions among those that challengers are opposed to
can enhance their ability to question states’ legitimacy and to manipulate the competition
between political elites. Thus, states or politicians can serve as movement allies on
particular issues or promote their strategic interests by aligning themselves with
movement opposition to other governments’ policies. These dynamics played out in each
of these countries as actors pursued electoral reform to empower politicians that
supported their cause.
The revolution at the ballot box was fueled by a number of factors: the initial
hesitancy among citizens in most countries to support the war, protests that helped to
raise consciousness regarding the reasons for the war and violations of international law,
a division among elites within and across countries, and the process of blowback.
Protests in several countries where political leaders originally cooperated with Bush
helped lead to their defeat as activists dramatized the conflict and demanded
accountability. For example, on the first anniversary of the invasion one million people
protested against Berusconi’s complicity with Bush and demanded the withdrawal Italian
troops (Ross 2004). His challenger and now new Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, pledged
to withdraw the troops in his first speech to the senate (Beeston 2005). In Poland
Karzynski was replaced by Donald Rusk, who used his first speech to parliament to
announce a withdrawal. In February of 2006 Blair was voted out of office for his
determination to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Bush, which put him at odds not only
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with British public opinion but also with his own Labor Party (which voted against their
own party), several members of his cabinet (who resigned over the Iraq issue), and
members of British intelligence and the military (Kershaw 2007). Furthermore,
Australian Prime Minister John Howard, one of the first coalition partners to send troops
to Iraq, was the first Australian prime minister to be voted out of parliament since 1929
as his eleven year old government was swept from power (Fullilove 2007). The new
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, had promised to withdraw combat troops from Iraq.
Using the ballot box to oust leaders that went against the demands of their citizens
therefore served to ultimately shape state decisions and change the discourse about the
war by questioning the legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine as it pertained to preemptive war.
By manipulating the divisions among political leaders internationally and domestically,
social movement actors created new alliances to oppose states’ agenda and ultimately
pressured them to pull out of the coalition. Thus, political process theory is useful in
clarifying how, in addition to the mobilization of resistance and use of contentious
politics, activist in the peace movement were able to affect change by also utilizing
institutional politics.
Activists also took advantage of public anxieties regarding the possibility of
future terrorist attacks in order to broaden the challenge to their governments’
collaboration with the United States. They argued that the possibility of blowback for
participating in the coalition was putting citizens at a greater risk. The most serious
episodes occurred in Spain and the UK. Three days before the Spanish general elections
in March of 2004 five Madrid commuter trains were bombed, killing 190 people and
injuring 1,400 (Elliot 2007). Voters elected Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero who fulfilled
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his campaign promise by swiftly removing Spain’s troops from Iraq. As mentioned
earlier, in March of 2003 preceding the invasion hundreds of thousands had protested in
Barcelona against the government’s support for the Bush Doctrine. Despite the claims by
the Spanish government that the separatist Basque fraction was responsible, the official
investigation by the Spanish judiciary determined the attacks were directed and carried
out by an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell (The Times 2007).
On July 7, 2005, fifty-two people were killed in London when bombs exploded on
various public transportation systems, and there was another failed bombing attempt on
July 21 (Cowell 2007). The London bombings also seem to have been conducted in
retaliation for Blair’s involvement in the coalition of the willing, as both were linked to
Islamist terrorist cells funded and aided by al-Qaeda. The Secret Organization Group of
al-Qaeda of Jihad Organizing in Europe claimed to be behind the July 7 events. In a
statement posted on an Islamic website, the group said the attacks were “in revenge of the
massacres that Britain is committing in Iraq and Afghanistan” (hindustantimes.com). In a
press conference in 2007 Bush stated that the United States and United Kingdom “are
fighting these terrorists with our military in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do
not have to face them in the streets of our own countries” (whitehouse.gov). Yet, the
bombings in London and Madrid allowed an opportunity for the peace movement to shift
the debate by arguing that citizens were increasingly vulnerable to attacks precisely
because they were attempting to fight al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq. By framing
grievances in this way, peace activists once again questioned the very notion of terrorism
and challenged leaders’ own use of framing in their attempt to gain public support for
contributing to the U.S. invasion.
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Consciousness-raising was another tactic that segments of the mobilization
against the war used to highlight the connection between the al-Qaeda attacks and the
alliances between their leaders and the United States. For example, following the
bombings Stop the War Coalition proclaimed, “Every day British troops stay in Iraq the
more, in the eyes of millions of people across the world, the people of this country are
taken to be implicated in a murderous occupation. By associating this country with the
U.S. puppet regime in Iraq, Blair increases the threat to everyone who lives there”
(swp.org). This boomerang effect created openings for activists to align themselves with
domestic politicians who sided with the movement and questioned the current
administrations’ position regarding the war on terrorism. It also served to solidify
divisions among politicians which translated into resources for social movement actors to
secure their goals as suggested by political process theories.
Finally, groups and individuals were able to take advantage of pragmatic failures
as the war dragged on and dissatisfaction among the general public increased. The lack
of an achievable goal or exit strategy, the exposure of the erroneous reports of weapons
of mass destruction, the infamous “Downing Street Memo” that disclosed that a U.S.
invasion of Iraq was inevitable and that the facts and intelligence were being “fixed
around the policy” to invade Iraq by the Bush administration all helped to strengthen
opposition to the war (Fielding 2005). Additionally, scandals of torture in violation of
international standards at the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons, and the recent
indictment of Blackwater Corporation for the fatal shooting of Iraqi citizens further
damaged the image of the United States both domestically and abroad. These incidents
helped to once again shift the discourse and framing from one based on the United States
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attempting to defend its citizens to one that focused on lies, deception, mishandling of the
war, and disregard for the rules established under the Geneva Convention. These all
helped to bolster the movement’s ability to tap into and increase public opinion against
the war and question U.S. foreign policy.

The Future of the Peace Movement
ANSWER’s framing of the invasion Iraq as a culmination of imperialism and the
project of neoliberalism, as forged by the United States to remold the Iraq economy under
the guise of the war on terrorism is sound. For instance, two months after the invasion
Paul Bremmer (director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Iraq), when
asked if the United States was in Iraq as liberators or occupiers responded, “It is a
difficult word, but, yes, we are here as occupiers” (Masri 2003). The link between the
war and the underlying agenda of forcing Iraq to pursue a path toward neoliberalism was
also clear in his orders that included: the full privatization of public enterprises, full
ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits,
the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies,
and the elimination of nearly all trade barriers (Ackerman 2008). Later, in November of
2008 Bush and Iraq’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, signed a “Declaration of
Principles” which stated that the United States would reject congressional legislation that
restricted funding to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of
providing for the permanent stationing of U.S. armed forces in Iraq or to exercise U.S.
control of the oil resources (Korb 2008). The connection between U.S. corporations
profiting from oil revenues and the war also became increasing evident as no-bid
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contracts written by oil corporations such as Exxon, Shell, Total, Chevron, and BP (all
are U.S.-based except BP which is British) to renew the oil concessions they lost to the
nationalization of the industry prevailed over offers from more than forty other countries
(Van Auken 2008).
Although, as the Bush Doctrine dictates, the United States can flex its military
muscle with or without domestic and international support, it is important to
acknowledge the strategic interests of other major players in the international struggle for
profit and political power. It is naïve to assume, as some factions of the peace movement
such as ANSWER sometimes do, that focusing exclusively on the United States as
empire activists can end illegitimate invasions and the economic/political interests that
drive them. As Lenin argued, globalization creates a system whereby numerous countries
vie for economic leverage over their adversaries, sometimes engaging in forms of
alliances, and sometimes resisting such alliances for their own purposes and agendas.
The war on terrorism and the Bush Doctrine are merely one of the latest examples of
these geopolitical strategies. Support for the Iraq war among political elites, as
previously noted, almost always ran contrary to the sentiments of their citizens and was
in many cases based on economic and political reasons as the IPS study revealed. This
did not occur only among weaker or smaller nations that are vulnerable to retaliation by
the United States. For example, Blair’s close alliance with the United States, though
overwhelmingly unpopular with British citizens, was supported by dominant sections of
Britain’s ruling elite, and particularly the Conservative Party because they perceived that
this allegiance would allow them to regain a share of Iraqi oil (Kershaw 2007).
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On the other hand, although much of the discord over the war stemmed from
moral or legal concerns among citizens, at the state level governments’ criticisms were
part and parcel of economic rivalries and the fear that Washington’s use of militarism
would arrange world policies and economics to its benefit. Although refusal among
world leaders to contribute support for the invasion may have been influenced in part by
their citizens’ attitudes as expressed through contentious politics, strategic economic
considerations undoubtedly also played a role. For example, both France and Russia had
negotiated large oil contracts with Iraq when Saddam Hussein was still in power; these
business arrangements were clearly jeopardized by the U.S. invasion. Also, historically
and for tactical reasons France and Germany have tried to establish an alliance that would
ensure autonomy against both the United States and Britain, their key European
competitor (Shribman 2002). Russia perhaps had the most to lose from the U.S. invasion
as its ability to earn billions of currency from its oil and gas sales would certainly be at
risk if Washington was able to take over the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region—
home to two-thirds of the world oil reserves (de Rooiji 2007).
Thus, political and economic arrangements between states, which can serve as
harbingers or impediments to social movements’ goals, are critical. Given the multiple
and interwoven relations among countries, the use of framing that simplistically views
the United Sates as empire is myopic. Rather than building a movement around the
lowest common denominator—opposing U.S. foreign policy—the mobilization should
pivot to offer an alternative response by realizing that imperialist ambitions are as diverse
as the peace movement itself. An acknowledgement of this multi-imperialism is essential
because the empire framing allows other countries to be misrepresented as a counter
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power while what they are doing geopolitically is often much the same as the United
States.
In addition to reframing the struggle through more cosmopolitan thinking and
understanding, the movement could benefit by establishing more transborder
coordination, and coordination that goes beyond merely synchronizing annual days of
protest. Much of this re-energizing is taking place between peace organizations and the
Global Justice Movement (GJM), which seeks alternatives to the present system of
neoliberalism and the institutions which support it that are more democratic, transparent,
and represent the will of the citizens. At global gatherings such as the World Social
Forum (WSF) members of the GJM have begun to redirect their attention to issues of war
and this eventually led to the development of the Global Antiwar Movement (GAWM).
In fact, it was at the 2002 social forum in Europe that activists set February 15th as a
global day of mobilization (Della Porta and Diania 2006). Subsequently, every year
GAWM has served as the main coordinator of protests on each anniversary of the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. ANSWER is one of the most committed members of the GAWM, and
many of the national organizations that constitute ANSWER were originally groups in
the GJM.
Groups working within the GAWM have engaged in consciousness-raising efforts
to highlight the current disconnect between citizens’ aspirations and the individuals,
parties, and institutions that purportedly represent and defend them and their interests.
Originally, in coordinated efforts they undertook campaigns against U.S. military
interventions that they perceived to be safeguarding the business interests of the elites at
the expense of local political and economic development (Della Porta and Mosca 2007).
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In addition to sponsoring antiwar rallies and demonstrations, they organized protests
outside of the offices of some of the largest U.S.-based corporate contractors in Iraq such
as Bechtel, Halliburton, Black & Veatch, and Carlyle Group across the United States
(Sanger 2005). More recently, however, they have expanded their vision and tactics to
incorporate a broader perspective on the relationship between militarism and capitalism
that does not focus exclusively on the United States. At the 2005 WSF the GAWM put
together a declaration that supports efforts to stop the economic occupation of Iraq by all
foreign corporations and international financial institutions, escalates the campaign
against war profiteers on an international scale through boycotts and direct action, and
calls for the passage of legislation that addresses the lack of effective oversight in the Iraq
contracting process (focusweb.org). This marks the emergence of a more globalist peace
movement that combines the best of the aspirations of the different segments of the
mobilization; one that acknowledges the link between forms of imperialism and
militarism and the need for sovereignty of all nations against the threat of preemptive
war, and a call for global institutions that are more democratic and do not exclusively
represent the interests of elites.
Perhaps the most comprehensive approach that goes beyond the U.S. as empire
discourse has been the establishment of Occupation Watch, a project led by UFPJ, Code
Pink (another prominent U.S.-based organization in the peace movement), and Global
Exchange (a San Francisco-based NGO that works on many progressive issues). Among
its goals are monitoring the role of all foreign companies in Iraq, advocating for Iraqis’
right to control their own resources, acting as a watchdog over the military occupation
and U.S.-appointed “governing council,” working with Iraqi movements that resist the
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occupation, supporting the creation of independent Iraqi civil society organizations, and
monitoring the physical impact of the invasion (International Crisis Center). These
concrete steps toward assisting Iraqis in their effort to regain self-determination, holding
foreign companies operating there accountable, and keeping a critical eye on military,
business, and governmental operations represent a promising start to a broader and more
encompassing understanding of the intermingling between economic, political and
military agendas and ways to resist them on multiple fronts.

Conclusion
The peace movement that emerged in the post 9-11 environment deserves credit
for raising fundamental doubts in the public and political spheres over the efficacy and
political wisdom of states’ participation in the coalition of the willing and the concept of
preemptive war as articulated in the Bush Doctrine. Resource mobilization theory can
explain how social movement actors solidified a sense of solidarity and collective identity
as they strove to influence public opinion and elected officials using contentious politics
in a variety of ways. Through the framing process some activists identified, interpreted
and attributed their grievances to international standards of justice as embodied by the
UN to appeal to mainstream values. Other members of the mobilization highlighted the
relationship between economic and political pursuits and militarism, and are skeptical of
international law and institutions in their present form. These different framing schemas
illustrate that the peace movement is by no means homogenous, although it shares a
common goal of Iraqi sovereignty and rejection of unilateral action through preemptive
war as executed under the Bush Administration.
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More structural-oriented theories, such as the political process framework
illustrate that the collapse of the coalition was also due in part to a revolution at the ballot
box as leaders of key U.S. allies were replaced by politicians sympathetic to the demands
of the peace movement. This was enhanced by a shift in political discourse as the
motivations for, and handling of the war, were increasingly questioned which allowed
activists to manipulate competing positions held by political elites domestically and
internationally. However, to further empower and revitalize the peace movement
activists must raise consciousness about how the political economy of war influences
government decisions, and perhaps more so than public opinion. Since political
representatives are often impervious to popular will, a key focal point of the movement
should be to expose how the continual game of chess played among the major national
powers informs state decisions and actions and how the corporate-dominated global
economy often gives rise to war in the first place. They must simultaneously and
systematically challenge the system of war and neoliberalism and offer alternatives such
as sovereign global institutions that can bolster local forms of sovereignty.
Whether or not recently elected President Obama will veer from the principles of
the Bush Doctrine will become evident in the following years. While campaigning he
promised to pull troops out of Iraq and claimed that he is committed to pursuing
diplomatic and political solutions ahead of military ones. In a debate with Senator
Hillary Clinton during the primaries he stated: “I don’t want to just end the war but I
want to end the mind-set that got us into war in the first place” (Ackerman 2008). Later,
in his inaugural address he elaborated on this by saying, “Our power alone cannot protect
us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, our power grows through its prudent
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use; our security emanates from the justness of our course, the force of our example, and
the tempering qualities of humility and restraint” (New York Times 2009). While this
hinted at a constructive diplomacy-oriented foreign policy, as president he has wavered in
backing up these statements. Once in office, he pushed back the withdrawal timeframe to
August 21, 2010, and while he has taken more than 90,000 troops out of Iraq and
announced the end of the American combat mission in Iraq, 50,000 troops remain to train
Iraqi forces (CBS News 2010).

Additionally, Afghanistan has replaced Iraq as the main

focus of American military efforts as more troops are sent to support the “surge.”
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Abstract
In any transitional justice mechanism there are tradeoffs between the search for
retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished. To date,
this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of
justice, which the authors argue are limited in the extent to which they can explain why
certain mechanisms—such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or
Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful. We argue that mechanisms
that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are
perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be
burdened—by their operation.

Introduction
Though justice mechanisms seek to hold wrongdoers accountable and deter future
wrongdoing, societies transitioning after violent conflict may have multiple goals for
their justice processes. Transitional justice refers to efforts made by states and/or the
international community to address criminal acts and human rights abuses of former
regimes during a transition from one regime to another (Gloppen 2005; Teitel 2000).
Individual mechanisms of transitional justice differ greatly, from tribunals to truth
commissions or even including indigenous forms and informal processes (Biggar 2003;
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Minow 1998). The reputed success or failure of these differing mechanisms has much to
do with the overall perceptions of the local populace. But what are the sources of these
perceptions? In any transitional justice mechanism there are often tradeoffs between the
search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished in
the post-conflict arena (Biggar 2003; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000). To date, this tension has
been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of distributive justice;
such norms are limited in the extent to which they can explain why mechanisms outside
formal tribunals—such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or
Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful (Sriram 2007; Uvin and
Mironko 2003; Wilson 2003).
In order to understand perceptions of success or failure of particular transitional
justice mechanisms at the local level, this article will examine the nexus between local
cultural traditions and the perception of procedural justice embodied in those particular
mechanisms used. We argue that where there is a high overlap between local expressions
and perceptions of procedural justice, individual mechanisms will be perceived as more
fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their
operation.
Goals of Transitional Justice
What are the goals of transitional justice? The primary goal of transitional justice
is to allow a country that has been plagued by human rights abuses to address them in a
manner that allows the country to move forward into a time of peace and development
rather than to stay trapped in a past characterized by violence and hatred (Amstutz 2005;
Hayner 2002; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000; Quinn 2009; Nolan 2007; Gloppen 2005).
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Within this overarching goal are a number of assertions about how to successfully draw a
line in time and move into a new future. One is the argument that in order to address the
past, justice must be served and punishment must be meted out to all perpetrators of
human rights abuses. Set against this argument is the idea that—for a variety of
reasons—justice is often unobtainable and the goal should instead be a full accounting of
the past in order to validate the experiences of the victims and to bring as many of the
crimes as possible out into the light of day. Additional goals include the sanctioning of
officials of the former regime—possibly through lustrations or fines—and the repair of
harm to victims, possibly through official apologies and/or reparations or restitution.
Perceptions of Success & Failure
Societies attempt to address or meet the multiple goals of transitional justice
through using one or more of a variety of mechanisms available, including tribunals, truth
commissions and local mechanisms. As we begin our analysis of perceptions of success
or failure for individual transitional justice mechanisms it is important to establish our
method for measuring those perceptions. Overall three generally recognized elements go
into a perception that a particular transitional justice mechanism is fair. The first two are
focused on the outcomes; retributive justice, which is focused on adequate sanctions, and
distributive justice, which is typically focused on the allocation of resources. The third is
known as procedural justice and focuses on the fairness of how decisions are made (Tyler
and Smith 1998). Psychological research in procedural justice has shown that people are
often more concerned with how they are treated during a judicial proceeding than with
whether or not they receive their desired outcomes, showing that individuals are more
likely to accept adverse outcomes if they believe that the procedures used to achieve
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those outcomes were fair (Tyler 2000). Rather than relying upon legal definitions of
procedural justice, we will be applying international and local cultural criteria to
recognized elements of social psychological frameworks of procedural justice; these
criteria will be fleshed out in more detail below.
Like many complex issues, the determination of success or failure for individual
transitional justice mechanisms depends upon the perspective of those standing in
judgment. Expanding on Mertius’ (2000) concept of different constituents for transitional
justice mechanisms we could define potential constituents whose perspective on justice
we need to consider to include the following: the victims of the human rights abuses,
those accused of perpetrating the abuses, local elites, local populations not directly
affected by the abuses, and the international community as represented by international
legal organs, non-governmental organizations and international governmental
organizations. It is clear that each of these constituencies might have a different
perspective on whether or not an individual mechanism meets their standards for success
and how well they do so.
For the international community, and for many legal scholars, the perceptions of
success for any particular transitional justice mechanism not only rely upon the outcomes
in terms of individuals prosecuted or people reconciled, but they also focus on the
fairness of the procedures used. Social psychological research confirms that justice
judgments include both outcome and procedural components, with procedural concerns at
least of equal, if not more, importance than outcomes. For example, some legal scholars
critique Rwanda’s gacaca system because it does not provide adequate legal protections
for both the accused and for prosecution witnesses (Corey 2004; Daly 2002; Lahiri 2009;
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Rettig 2008). These critics use what they consider to be a universal standard for fair
procedures, which seems to also include the assumption that courts are needed to channel
the natural desire for revenge (Jacoby 1983).
By contrast, to outsiders it may appear that grassroots support for, or
condemnation of, a particular transitional justice mechanism may have more to do with
its outcomes, either retributive or distributive, than its procedures. The question of
whether perceptions of outcome fairness or procedural fairness dominate a “folk”
conception of what is important to local populations, local elites, victims and bystanders
is an important one in helping to determine what has worked in transitional justice, why it
may have worked, and how multiple mechanisms may be integrated to address both
procedural and outcome needs where possible.

Culture and Procedure in Transitional Justice
The issue of culture as expressed through legal traditions is one that has been
largely ignored by the academic community in its study of transitional justice. With the
exception of a few scholars (Falk 2003; Fletcher, Weinstein, and Rowen 2009; Miller
2006), questions of the fit of transitional justice mechanisms with local legal traditions
are rarely asked. Many argue that retributive justice is the universal preference, with
restorative mechanisms used only when conditions prohibit the use of trials and other
forms of retributive justice. Others have argued that restorative justice provides benefits
for the victims of these crimes that retributive justice cannot; with the retributive justice
argument often framed as a moral dilemma and the restorative justice argument as a
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method of achieving the goals of transitional justice alongside the recognition of political
necessity (Hirsch 2007; Leebaw 2003; Minow 1998).
One method to address the question of cultural fit of transitional justice
mechanisms with existing legal traditions is to examine them within a framework of
procedural justice. Procedural justice provides a promising avenue for inquiry because
research has shown that people are often more concerned with how they are treated—
how fair they perceive the process to be—than they are concerned about outcomes. In
other words, individuals are more likely to accept sub-optimal outcomes for themselves if
they believe that the processes used to achieve those outcomes were fair (Tyler 2000). In
the psychological realm procedural justice is characterized by the study of the extent to
which individuals have control over or an impact on judicial processes and the extent and
nature of control over decisions made in the judicial context (Thibaut and Walker 1975).
Several sets of criteria have been enumerated for the study of procedural justice,
however, work done by social psychologist Tom Tyler (1988, 2000, 2006, 2009), widely
recognized as an authority on the subjects of procedural justice, trust and legitimacy,
focuses on four interlocking concepts of the neutrality of the forum, the trustworthiness
of the authorities, treatment with dignity and respect, and the opportunity for participation
or voice.
Tyler considers procedural justice concerns to be universal, although studies show
that the meaning of justice can “vary depending on the nature of the dispute or the
allocation involved” (Tyler 1988, 107). While the work done by Tyler and others focuses
on basic settings—formal versus cooperative—one could reasonably extrapolate that, like
distributive justice, the meaning of procedural justice could also depend upon the local
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traditional context within which it is embedded. Tyler looks at courts versus police to
create his typology of more formal to less formal—or more cooperative. This work seeks
to shift the contextual debate to examine forums based upon folk or traditional
conceptions of procedural justice as opposed to more formal conceptions of procedural
justice usually characterized by formal court settings and the trappings recognizable by
most readers from industrialized states.
Procedural justice concerns seem to be shared at the level of the society, as norms,
rather than determined by individual preference. Tyler’s work showed that individual
characteristics had no impact upon criteria used to assess procedural justice, suggesting
“definitions of the meaning of justice within particular settings may be part of the cultural
beliefs shared by members of [that] society” (Tyler 1988, 132). This cultural congruity
within a context also facilitates acceptance of decisions made in these settings since it is
likely that parties will share a conception of procedural justice. Shared conceptions of a
just process will lead to shared acceptance of the outcomes as just.
Although one could argue that comparing transitional justice mechanisms like
South Africa’s TRC and Rwanda’s gacaca courts is a bit like comparing apples to
oranges, we feel that the use of procedural justice criteria, when viewed through the lens
of cultural congruency, can tell us something about why those who accepted these venues
as valid did so, as well as shed light on why these venues were rejected by others. Overall
we understand that, even though each transitional justice mechanism was designed to
promote reconciliation to a greater or lesser degree, it is difficult to measure both
mechanisms by the same standards of retributive or distributive justice because they were
each designed to have different outcomes; with one focused on storytelling and the other
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on restitution and punishment. However, as outlined by Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal,
Tyler and those in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the process by which parties
attempt to resolve their differences may in fact be more important than the outcome of
winning or losing (Tyler and Smith 1998, 601; Vidmar 1992, 224). Koh found that
Tyler’s and Leventhal’s criteria were present in mediation, noting that “[p]rocedural
justice is immeasurably important in both mediation and litigation in determining the
participating party’s satisfaction and likely adherence to the results” (Koh 2004, 176). We
argue that if one can successfully compare judicial and non-judicial forums by using
procedural justice criteria as Koh has done, then it should be eminently possible to do so
with transitional justice forums like the TRC and gacaca.
International or Formal Conceptions of Procedural Justice
Most studies of procedural justice have been undertaken in Western societies and
have largely concerned themselves with the interactions of individuals with criminal
justice systems—either in formal court settings or in more informal interactions with law
enforcement (Hauenstein, McGonigle, and Flinder 2001, 40-41)—or with group decisionmaking in organizational settings (Paese, Lind, and Kanfer, 1988). Individuals within a
given society are usually aware of society’s norms of procedural justice and use these
norms to assess their own or other’s interactions with decision groups or authorities
(Tyler 1988, 132). Given the dominant legalistic and individualistic culture of the West,
particularly the United States, Western norms tend to place high value on formal
processes that stress the neutrality of decision-making forums and the protection of civil
rights for the accused (Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004). Criticisms of alternative forums such
as gacaca most often come from political and legal arenas and are largely concerned with
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the unwillingness or inability of these forums to provide for an adequate defense for the
accused, a lack of legal training for judges, prosecutors and the like, and a possible lack
of equality in punishment for offenders (Amnesty International 2002; Betts 2005; Brown
2010; Clark 2010; Corey 2004; Uvin 2000; Megwalu and Loizides 2010). These legal
criteria for justice processes are not the same as what social psychological research tells
us is important to most participants in justice proceedings. There the priorities are those
identified above, the neutrality of the forum, trustworthiness of the authorities, perception
of treatment with dignity and respect, and the opportunity for participation or voice. In
addition, while the importance of procedural justice can be found across cultural contexts,
the shape of what is considered to be procedurally just may vary according to particular
context (Lind and Earley 1992; Morris and Leung 2000).
Folk or Local Conceptions of Procedural Justice
Morris and Leung’s (2000) review of social psychological research in justice
shows that while cultural dimensions of a society (collectivist vs. individualist) can have
an impact on perceptions of distributive fairness, cross cultural evidence suggests that
procedural justice perceptions are determined by the same, or similar, perceptions of
fairness that characterized Thibaut and Walker’s original studies. Their review points out
that in diverse, largely northern societies, criteria of having a voice in the process,
perceiving concern by the authorities, and receiving treatment with dignity and respect all
played important roles in the perception of procedural justice felt by disputants in public
and private settings (Morris and Leung 2000, 115). Given these findings we believe that a
fruitful starting point for our analysis is to examine the cultural expressions of Tyler’s
four elements of procedural justice, outlined above, in each of our case studies. As an
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example, one of the defining features of South Africa’s TRC was its provision for public
hearings, which, in Hayner’s estimation helped shift the TRC’s “focus from product (its
final report) to process, engaging the public as an audience and encouraging press
coverage of its issues over a longer period of time. A transparent process also helps to
assure the public that there is no cover-up of the evidence, nor a blatant political bias in
the commission’s work” (Hayner 2002, 225, emphasis in original). Such a transparent
process encouraged trust in the authorities, provided voice to victims, and showed parties
being treated with dignity and respect. We will engage in similar investigation with two
transitional justice mechanisms: Rwanda’s gacaca and South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.
Culture and Process in the TRC
South Africa experienced thirty years of armed resistance against its Apartheid
regime and during this process the country suffered from massacres, killings and severe
discriminatory policies against its majority non-white population. After the election of
Nelson Mandela in 1994, with the considerable input of civil society members, the South
African Parliament passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act in
mid-1995 and with the lead of Archbishop Desmond Tutu the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was inaugurated in December 1995 (Hayner 2002, 40-41).
The goals of TRC were to grant amnesty to those who made a full disclosure of their
crimes, to give both victims and perpetrators a say in determining the truth, to restore the
human dignity, to make recommendations to Parliament on rehabilitation and reparation
issues; and in the long-run to help heal the victims, society and to create a new culture of
respect for human rights (Borris 2002, 165; van Zyl 1999, 654). To assist in meeting
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these objectives, the legislation established three committees within the TRC: the Human
Rights Violations Committee (HRVC), the Amnesty Committee (AC) and the Reparation
and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) (van Zyl 1999, 654). Although the TRC did not
have the power to punish people, it did not provide a blanket amnesty to all human rights
violators. Since hearings were public, embarrassment, shame, remorse and
marginalization from society became a sort of punishment under the exercise of the TRC
(van Zyl 1999, 662).
The three committees each had a different mandate and each approached its
mandate in a different fashion regarding those procedural justice elements that were
incorporated into its processes. However, all three committees were informed by the
tenets of restorative justice and used an adaptation of a Xosa proverb known as ubuntu.
The meaning of ubuntu comes from the root of a Zulu-Xhosa word, or proverb,
which means that “a human being is a human being only through its relationship to other
human beings” (Marx 2002, 52). Essentially it is a description of humans as belonging to
a community and defining individual good within communal good. Marx is skeptical
about the origins of ubuntu and whether it does actually represent a truly African way of
being, as opposed to what he describes as its original meaning, a sense of hospitality and
the welcoming and integration of strangers (Marx 2002, 52). Regardless of its etymology,
the fact remains that ubuntu has been presented as an African mode of thought that places
community harmony above individual self-interest, based on the notion—whether real or
mythologized—that citizens of the New South Africa should think of the nation as a
larger community. The downside, as Marx sees it, is that by focusing on communal good
over individual good, ubuntu enforces conformity, and legitimizes the policies of
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addressing reparations through structural changes to society rather than through help to
individual victims (Marx 2002, 54).
In contrast to Marx’ skepticism regarding ubuntu, Antjie Krog insists that it is not
just a belief in communal harmony that enforces conformity, but is instead provides the
cultural foundation upon which rests the popular understanding of the use of and need for
reconciliation as a central part of the TRC. Krog’s view of ubuntu is one that focuses on
the interconnectedness of individuals, describing the feeling of ubuntu as
“interconnectedness-towards-wholeness” in order to argue that the TRC rested on a
foundation of a desire towards wholeness which led to a willingness by many victims to
offer forgiveness as a step towards restoring humanity to perpetrators and to themselves
(Krog 2008a, 2008b).
The question remains as to the precise role of ubuntu: was it a foundation of the
TRC, generating and sustaining a desire towards wholeness and forgiveness? Was it an
instrument that the TRC used to build a new nation, squashing, in the process, the natural
desire of victims for retribution? Or was it a cultural embodiment for elements of
procedural justice; a manner though which the TRC could show its respect for the parties
who came before them and give voice to their pain while, hopefully, engendering trust
and respect for both the TRC itself and the new dispensation at large. Before attempting
to answer this question, we turn to Rwanda’s gacaca courts.
Culture and Process in Gacaca
Violence between Hutu and Tutsi groups peaked in 1994 with a genocide of
Tutsis in Rwanda that left over 800,000 dead and over 130,000 in prison on suspicion of
committing acts of genocide. Even though there was a desire to bring justice to the
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victims and to hold the perpetrators accountable, a sense of impunity persisted in
Rwanda. “With [its] judicial infrastructure destroyed and most prosecutors and judges
killed in 1994, there was no chance that [Rwanda’s] national court system could
prosecute all those responsible for such crimes” (Tiemessen 2004, 57-58).
Gacaca courts were established as a response to the ineffectiveness of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and national court system to address
this backlog of untried genocide cases. In 2001, Rwandans elected approximately
255,000 people to act as judges in these courts. “The process of Gacaca is derived from
traditional Rwandan community courts, in which the elders would sit on the grass—
Gacaca is the Kinyarwandan word for grass—and resolve community conflicts” (Daly
2002, 356). Village elders and community members gather together on a patch of grass to
discuss civil disputes and elders present a resolution to the issue in an effort to salvage
social peace and cohesion in the village. The primary aim of traditional gacaca was to
restore social harmony and secondarily to mete out punishments (Nagy 2009, 99).
Traditional uses were for resolving personal, land, marital and inheritance disputes (Betts
2005, 743). Apuuli notes that the type of justice practiced in traditional gacaca was an
unmediated folk or popular justice that depended upon a “common sense understanding
rather than upon law;” modern gacaca represents a mediated form of this type of justice
wherein the participants are more constrained by the apparatus of the state (Apuuli 2009,
14-15).
The modern gacaca process differs from its traditional forebears in three key
aspects: The traditional process was voluntary, the traditional process was concerned with
local civil and community issues and the traditional process gave community leaders
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more leeway to decide individual punishments (Corey 2004, 82). Modern gacaca is a
state-sponsored program, with attendance required by all community members. Unlike its
traditional brethren, modern gacaca addresses criminal and civil crimes associated with
the genocide. Under its initial inception, modern gacaca was concerned with what were
known as category 2, 3 or 4 crimes under the 1996 Organic Law—category 1 crimes
were largely reserved for those who plotted or mastermined the genocide with the other
categories reserved for those who committed murder, serious nonlethal assaults or
property offenses (Lahiri 2009, 323). Initially the judges were given wide latitude in
sentencing and were allowed give life sentences for some crimes. A 2004 amendment
from the law combined categories 2 and 3 and limited the maximum penalty to thirty
years imprisonment (Corey 2004, 82-83; Lahiri 2009, 325-326).
Traditional and modern gacaca share some clear similarities, including the
participation of the whole community in the process, a focus on community healing
rather than just punishment, and the use of a plea bargaining mechanism to encourage
truth telling with the goal of reconciliation rather than just punishment (Vandeginste
2003, 271). Additionally, much of the modern gacaca process derives from its traditional
forebear. This includes the open-air setting where, unlike a formal court proceeding,
everyone in attendance is allowed to fully participate. This means that judges, the
accused, accuser(s) and all those present can speak out, question those giving testimony
and otherwise interject their opinions. Any of the testimony can be used in determining
guilt or innocence and there was no initial requirement for physical evidence (Corey
2004, 83). Recent changes in procedure have meant that the gathering of evidence is
based less on hearsay and more on information gathering by local administrators assigned

Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1

129

Culture and Procedural Justice in Transitioning Societies

to assist the gacaca judges. This information is then verified by the assembled
populations, although individuals are still allowed to speak against or in defense of any
person as well as ask questions (Nagy 2009, 93-94).
Another important aspect of gacaca are the extensive provisions made for plea
bargaining. Provisions have been written into the gacaca law that allow for major
reductions of sentences for those who confess either before the trial begins or before a
verdict has been reached. Clark argues that the gacaca system facilitates reconciliation
through its plea bargaining system, which reintegrates perpetrators back into the
community through service—often alongside and in service of survivors and victims—as
well as direct compensation to victims and survivors (Clark 2009, 315).
Overall, modern gacaca was designed by Rwanda’s government to largely
resemble its traditional forebear, with processes rooted in traditional gacaca and, thus,
highly recognizable to the local population (Betts 2005, 743). However, as we will see
below, there are serious critiques of both gacaca and the TRC processes as being unfair to
defendants and/or victims. As we move to the next section, we will begin analyzing both
the practices of gacaca and those of the TRC in order to determine the extent to which
they correspond to established categories of psychological procedural justice.

Judging Success Based on Process
We are examining cultural expressions of transitional justice in order to determine
the extent to which they correspond to established categories of psychological procedural
justice. Our argument is that the higher the overlap between the processes of transitional
justice mechanisms and local cultural expressions of procedural justice, the more that
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such mechanisms will be perceived as fair and just by local populations, even by those
who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their operation. Our analysis
relies primarily upon Tyler’s four criteria to examine both the South African TRC and
Rwanda’s gacaca in order to determine the extent to which their culturally-based
processes fulfill the criteria of procedural justice.
The four criteria identified by procedural justice research outlined above and used
in this analysis are neutrality, the trustworthiness of the authorities, treatment with dignity
and respect, and the opportunity for participation or voice. In each case, these criteria are
examined at two levels; the formal/international and folk/local. When we operationalize
these concepts at both levels we are generally looking for different indicators. At the
formal or international level we are generally looking for indicators that are usually
present in judicial systems based on a “Western” notion of fair procedures and
protections for the accused. At the folk or local level we might be looking for something
slightly different. As opposed to a Western conception of justice, which concentrates on
the rights of the accused and views criminal actions as harming the state, we might find
indicators that community harmony would be more valued or that group norms might
lead people to accept processes that are based more on informal understandings of fair
treatment and less on codified rules of evidence, disclosure or procedure (Barton et al.
1983; Nader and Todd 1978; Zartman 2000b). Our understanding is that informal
procedures which place a higher value on community cohesiveness and collective good
over individual rights may be more acceptable when those procedures are embedded
within or derive from cultural constructs which are highly valued in the local culture.
This does not imply that everyone will be satisfied, but it is more likely that larger
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portions of the local population will find these processes acceptable because they derive
from local traditions.
Neutrality
We use Tyler’s definition of neutrality, which is focused on participants’
“judgments about the honesty, impartiality, and objectivity” of those in charge of the
decision making mechanism in question, in this case, the transitional justice process.
Tyler’s research showed that participants believed that these authority figures should not
be swayed by personal values and biases (Tyler 2000, 118, 122). This criterion appears to
converge with Leventhal’s criteria of the ability to suppress bias, the quality or accuracy
of the decisions made, the ability to correct unfair or inaccurate decisions and the degree
to which the process meets standards of fairness and morality (Leventhal 1980).
Neutrality as viewed through formal or international conceptions of procedural
justice is most embodied by the sets of rules and procedures that ensure that the accused
have the ability to mount the best defense possible and have some likelihood of being
acquitted of their charges, especially if they are not guilty. The Nuremberg Tribunal is
often cited as one of the best examples of a transitional justice mechanism where the
authorities, in this case the judges, acted with a high level of neutrality; largely because
they found three defendants innocent of the charges brought against them.
Neutrality at the folk or popular justice level, by contrast, is much less clear in
terms of the procedures that traditional institutions should undertake in order to assure
claimants or defendants that the judges or arbiters will treat all sides equally. Much as in
the difference between acceptable mediators in Western societies requiring some sort of
training or certification and mediators in traditional societies requiring some sort of social
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position, either elected or not, in order to be acceptable to the parties (Moore 2003), it
appears that the difference between judges in formal systems and judges in informal
systems depends, on the one hand, the training and knowledge of the individual and, on
the other hand, the social acceptability of the individual. While this is not exactly
analogous it appears that informal—folk or popular justice systems—tend to rely more
upon the social acceptability of the individual arbiters than upon codified procedures that
protect the rights of individuals. Instead these arbiters are assumed to have the best
interests of the community at heart and, unless they prove otherwise through their
actions, they will generally be accorded a level of trust that goes along with their
presumed neutrality (Barton et al. 1983; Zartman 2000a).
We found that the South African TRC has somewhat strong indicators for
neutrality of the forum and its commissioners, but there were a few problems. Two
possible standards can be applied: Western procedural justice standards on the one hand,
and cultural procedural justice standards based on ubuntu on the other. By Western
standards the emphasis of the Amnesty Commission on granting amnesty, particularly the
preference for witness testimony favoring amnesty over that favoring prosecution, calls
into question the neutrality of the forum and of the commissioners. However, when
judged through the lens of ubuntu, with its preference on social restoration over
individual retribution, one could reasonably argue that the AC’s neutrality was focused
on communal over individual good. Despite this argument, however, the fact that
ubuntu—as popular as it might be—was not universally accepted as a standard by which
justice should be measured, gives rise to survey evidence that showed most South
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Africans felt that the amnesty provisions of the TRC were unfair to victims (Gibson
2002).
The Human Rights Violations Commission (HRVC), through the explicit focus of
its creating act on the needs of victims, was seen as partial to their needs, leaning more
heavily towards providing voice, dignity and respect to victims than towards presenting
an image of neutrality (Chapman and Van der Merwe 2008; De Lange 2000; Garkawe
2003). In this arena the ideals of ubuntu required fidelity to compassion for victims of
Apartheid and to healing the community through affirming their individual experiences.
By eschewing a legal-forensic definition of the truth and distancing themselves from
formal conception of neutrality, the HRVC adhered to those elements of procedural
justice that were more congruent with the characterization of ubuntu as focusing on the
interdependence of healing and forgiveness as cornerstones of reconciliation (Krog
2008b). Unlike the issues raised by the AC’s emphasis on amnesty, the relative lack of
importance accorded to neutrality by the HRVC was not seen as a major problem by most
in South African society, who indicated that they overwhelmingly felt that the TRC had
done a good job of helping victims by letting families know what had happened to their
loved ones (Gibson 2005, 346). However, as will be seen below, the necessity for a level
of selectivity did give rise to issues around equal access and the ability of all who wished
to tell their stories having the ability to do so, somewhat damaging the perception of
neutrality of the Commission’s choice of stories to hear publicly.
Shifting to consider the procedural justice criteria in the gacaca courts of Rwanda,
there are several deficiencies that lead to low perceived neutrality regardless of whether
we use a Western or local lens. First, despite its prominence on the local level, gacaca is
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still a state-sponsored process and was perceived to be subject to state pressure. Second,
it has been seen by some as a form of victor’s justice, especially when one considers that
Tutsi members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) accused of massacres are excluded
from the possibility of prosecution (Corey 2004, 86; Tiemessen 2004, 65). In addition to
this danger, Uvin and Mironko argue that many genocide survivors do not testify for fear
of revenge and victims of rape refuse to testify because such issues are not made public in
Rwandan culture (Uvin and Mironko 2003, 227). Additionally, where there were few
available survivors, people gave false testimony without fear of being exposed by other
witnesses, and when survivors did testify they often ran the risk of re-traumatization
(Uvin and Mironko 2003, 227). Other critiques of gacaca stem largely from the
international perspective and the expectation that any trial system should provide justice
based upon Western standards such as the rights to representation, a speedy trial,
reasonable detention times and conditions. Uvin contends that the failure to meet these
conditions violates the defendants human rights, although he observed that “many people
among the general population seem…in favor of the Gacaca system” (Uvin 2000, 6).
Daly (2002) notes that, at least in 2002, there was widespread support for gacaca,
with a number of independent surveys reporting support as high as 80 percent and higher
among Rwanda’s prison population, the people who would be the most directly affected
by the new courts. However, as with other aspects of criticism of gacaca there are some
concerns that opponents would not be willing to express their opposition. In a public
statement issued on January 23, 2006, Amnesty International criticized the Rwandan
Government and expressed concerns over the intimidation and harassment of
Bonaventure Bizumuremyi, editor of the independent newspaper Umuco, who had used
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his paper to criticize the government for tightly controlling the judiciary. A colleague of
Bizumuremyi’s, Jean Léonard Rugambage was arrested and accused of being a
génocidaire after he authored an article alleging that gacaca judges had used their
positions for personal gain and to “settle personal feuds.” These critiques lead one to
question the neutrality of the forum and the extent to which opposition to gacaca, both
within and without the actual process, is allowed free expression. An indicator of falling
support for gacaca, and perhaps the perception of its reduced neutrality, is the fact that
recent studies have shown that forced attendance and information campaigns are now
required to increase participation, whereas attendance and support was initially quite high
(Nagy 2009, 95).
In Longman’s eyes one potentially serious problem with the neutrality of gacaca
is the dual role played by judges at the lowest (category 4) level who serve both as judges
and as investigating prosecutors. This is most serious during the pre-trial phase when the
investigating judges have some technical assistance from the state that the defendant does
not (Longman 2006, 219). However, he counters that there are two factors that mitigate
against this preventing an adequate defense on the part of the accused. The first is that,
like the defendant, the judges are not legal experts; meaning that the court would be
tipped too far in the defendant’s favor if he or she was allowed to hire an attorney while
no one else had access to one. The second mitigating factor is the inclusion of the entire
community in the process where, presumably, supporters and family members of the
defendant would be able to speak on his or her behalf (Longman 2006, 218).
To summarize, each of these critiques, especially when placed alongside the
concerns that Tutsi crimes are not being brought to trial along with the contention that
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gacaca is being used to cement the power of the RPF government, violate Tyler’s criteria
for procedural justice, namely, they contravene the perceived neutrality of the forum and
the trustworthiness of the authorities.
As noted, attendance at some sessions has been diminishing, with various reasons
being given for the loss. Some reasons center around procedural justice issues, namely
the sense that gacaca is not neutral because it only addresses Hutu crimes and not Tutsi
ones, particularly those carried out by the RPF. Other issues raised have to do with the
time required of people who would otherwise be tending their farms or engaging in the
labor necessary to live. Clark notes that community-level gacaca sessions often take up a
whole day and that some survivors still feel too traumatized to participate or fear
retribution if they speak out (Clark 2009, 318). Part of this may be due to an initial lack
of communication by the government about why prisoners were being released,
generating confusion, uncertainty and fear; leaving some Rwandans feeling that the
government is asking too much of them and providing too little in the way of a supportive
environment for their participation (Clark 2009, 319).
In overall terms we can see that the TRC does well in terms of neutrality of the
forum, though not without its detractors. The perception that both the AC and HRVC
were neutral depends largely upon viewing them through the lens of ubuntu as a
foundation for South African (or at least black South African) society (Krog 2008a,
2008b). The alternative view of ubuntu, that it was largely a nation-building exercise
designed to convince black South Africans to give up their rights (Coertze 2001; Marx
2002; Wilson 2001), could be characterized as a Western view of ubuntu, parallel to a
Western or formal view of the TRC as failing to meet legal criteria of procedural justice
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rather than psychological criteria. In shifting our view of the TRC to one characterized by
ubuntu we can, as Krog intimates, see that some subsequent disappointment with the
TRC may come from a failure of those pardoned to abide by the tenets of ubuntu rather
than disappointment that they did not receive adequate punishment (Krog 2008a, 218219).
By contrast we can see serious deficiencies in the perceived neutrality of
Rwanda’s gacaca courts whether we view them through a formal lens or through a folk
lens which, presumably, values this traditional method of resolving disputes and places
less importance upon the legal criteria of procedural justice. From the unwillingness of
the Rwandan government to consider Tutsi crimes to allegations that defendants were
browbeaten or not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, it appears that the neutrality of
the gacaca forum was seriously compromised (Amnesty International 2002, 24-25). That
these issues were seen as serious by ordinary Rwandans could be deduced from the need
to shift from voluntary attendance to mandatory attendance, often requiring authorities to
round up community members who were either unaware of the gacaca session or, more
likely, had chosen not to attend (Amnesty International 2002; Clark 2009). The additional
problems alluded to above, the dual role of some judges, the lack of legal representation
for defendants, and the pressure to plead guilty in return for lesser sentences, are more of
a concern to the international community with its formal conception of procedural justice.
However, these problems may also take on a more serious role to ordinary Rwandans
given the problems with neutrality at the folk level.
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Trustworthiness
According to Tyler people judge the trustworthiness of authorities by “whether
the person is benevolent and caring, is concerned about their situation and their concerns
and needs, considers their arguments, tries to do what is right for them, and tries to be
fair” (Tyler 2000, 122). A key indicator of trustworthiness is the willingness of
authorities to justify their decisions by giving an account of how they reached them. In
this sense those arbiters that move from mere neutrality to having their decisions
respected as authoritative have, in Tyler’s estimation, established some trust with those
whom their decisions affect. In some cases it appears that this trustworthiness can be
applied to a category of people while in others it is applied to those who have
“particularized personal connections” such as a neighborhood police officer, pastor or
tribal elder (Tyler 2000, 122). Here we can see a potential differentiation between the
Western conception of an arbiter who is trustworthy because of his or her position and a
traditional conception of someone who is trustworthy because of his or her personal
characteristics (Moore 2003). When authorities have established this sort of legitimacy,
people no longer feel the need to inspect every decision, every outcome, because they
trust the process and the authority to do right.
In the case of the TRC the commissioners needed to appear trustworthy to
victims, survivors and to those who applied for amnesty. In particular, Archbishop Tutu
appeared to be genuinely concerned and caring for the welfare of those victims and
survivors who testified before the HRVC, often sharing their emotional pain and
affirming their willingness to speak to the commission and share their stories (Shore and
Kline 2006). As Tyler notes a key element of appearing trustworthy for authorities is the
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justification of their decisions (Tyler 2000, 122). Given that the HRVC did not make
decisions except in regard to selecting cases for public hearing, it seems that the
justification of decisions is less relevant in this case. However, the AC did justify its
decisions to grant or deny amnesty to those applicants who testified in public before it,
strengthening the trustworthiness of that committee.
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Reparations and Rehabilitation
Committee (RRC) in terms of trustworthiness because they were relegated to an advisory
body and held no public meetings. The contention that the South African Parliament
showed little care for the troubles of survivors with their one-time payment of 30,000
Rand is one that cannot be laid directly at the feet of the RRC, which had recommended a
wide range of reparations including the urgent interim reparations, individual grants,
symbolic reparations, community rehabilitation programs and institutional reforms.
Although mostly not implemented, this wide variety showed concern with the well-being
of both victims and the wider society that—because of its inability to implement
directly—may or may not have affected the RRC’s level of trustworthiness.
Many from the international community criticize gacaca based on its procedural
faults, most notably the lack of counsel for defendants and the minimal training given to
the elected judges. According to Amnesty International the “competence of the gacaca
judges is questionable” noting that their training is “grossly inadequate” and, more
relevant to the consideration of trustworthiness, this lack of legal training may make them
easier to manipulate by government officials and local power brokers (Amnesty
International 2002, 38).
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In the case of Rwanda’s gacaca courts the trustworthiness of its authorities is
different depending on the lens used to examine it. Examining gacaca with a more
formal, or Western, conception of trustworthiness of the authorities is problematic both
for the RPF political leadership and for the gacaca judges themselves. Regarding judges,
the charges brought forth by Amnesty and others that their lack of legal training may
make the judges susceptible to manipulation by government officials, reduces one’s sense
of their trustworthiness, as does the accusation that individual judges used their positions
for personal gain; which, if true, violates both the judges’ trustworthiness and the sense
that gacaca itself was a neutral forum, free from personal biases (Amnesty International
2002). Looking through our informal folk lens gives a similar picture of the
trustworthiness of RPF officials, namely that perception that the government is using
gacaca to consolidate its hold on power and, at the same time, to shield themselves from
prosecution. However, when using a local cultural lens to examine the trustworthiness of
gacaca judges a different result appears. Arguments that gacaca judges lack legal
competence are countered by the argument that judges have what is known as ‘contextual
competence’ meaning that their deep understanding of the local context and the goals of
gacaca in promoting reconciliation alongside meting out punishment call for a different
standard for evaluating judges. Clark notes that in terms of assessing gacaca some
communities have come together to address the issues behind the genocide and to support
one another, while other communities have experienced an increase in tension and
acrimony following the sessions. The key difference for Clark is that in the former cases
there was adequate mediation from the judges that was often lacking in the latter (Clark
2009, 317). Therefore, trustworthiness in this context has more to do with the personal
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qualities of the judge in question, their willingness and ability to intervene in a manner
which engages the trust of the community and less to do their level of legal acumen or
ability to follow the rules of gacaca procedure.
Dignity and Respect
The definition of treatment with dignity and respect seems quite simple and
straightforward. According to Tyler, it means that when dealing with authorities, people
feel that “their dignity as people and members of society is recognized and
acknowledged” (Tyler 2000, 122). Tyler further notes that since being treated politely
and with respect are essentially unrelated to outcomes, this aspect of procedural justice is
“especially relevant” because it affirms an individual’s status in a manner that does not
rely upon a positive outcome to have a positive effect on perceptions of fairness (Tyler
2000, 122).
When examining the criterion of dignity and respect we need to examine the
perceptions of all parties, victims and witnesses as well as the perpetrators or the accused,
in order to determine the extent to which they felt they received adequate recognition of
their dignity and respect. In addition we need to do this using both our Western and
“folk” cultural lenses. Overall, we see that the TRC appears to have done a fairly good
job in meeting the dignity and respect criterion in the case of both victims and of the
accused, whether examined through our Western justice lens or a local, traditional lens as
illuminated by ubuntu. Victims and survivors testifying before the HRVC were showered
with empathy by the commissioners, especially by Archbishop Tutu, and had the
satisfaction of acknowledgment of the serious crimes that they had suffered from
(Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 6; Minow 1998, 71-74). The AC as well, in its own way,
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met the criterion of being treated with dignity and respect. Defendants before the
committee were afforded counsel and, even though they were cross examined, they were
not required to profess contrition for their acts (Shore and Kline 2006, 316-317). This last
point was a sore spot with many victims and some of the general public, but on the
whole, as Govier (2002) notes, repentance cannot be demanded, nor forgiveness, but
neither are possible without acknowledgment of the original wrong done.
In terms of treating the victims who did testify with dignity and respect, the
HRVC did quite well in some respects. The appointment of Archbishop Desmond Tutu as
the chair of the commission created a space within which he infused the HRVC process
with Christian practices drawn from local customs. From opening prayers to exhortations
and other comments, Tutu “intentionally created an environment that fostered practices
that bore a resemblance to recognizable ceremonial practices” (Shore and Kline 2006,
314). In fact, the proceedings of the HRVC—the committee that Tutu chaired—differed
greatly from the AC, with the former adhering to a “religious redemptive” formulation of
truth while the latter concentrated on what is known as a “legal-forensic” definition of
truth (Shore and Kline 2006, 313). Shore and Kline note that the overt use of religious
language and symbols in the HRVC was, in fact, comforting to many of the victims and
survivors. The role of religion in South Africa—whether the Black churches or the Dutch
Reformed Church—has never been private nor solely concerned with the salvation and
spiritual well being of just individuals (Shore and Kline 2006, 310, 315). The cultural
credibility and fit of the use of religious symbolism by Archbishop Tutu and other
members of the HRVC gave the proceedings the air of comfort and support, particularly
with their respect for deeply-held religious values. Further, the ability of those victims
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who were called to testify to tell their stories to a sympathetic and official audience also
contributes to the sense that they were treated with dignity and respect, as did the lack of
cross examination by perpetrators. While those who were excluded from giving
testimony might have lost some sense of voice—and possibly some level of
trustworthiness and respect for the process—evidence from studies by the Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation showed that many who did participate likely felt
that telling their stories in front of a respectful institutional body was the most useful part
of the process; indicating that this criteria for procedural justice was likely met (Hamber,
Nageng, and O'Malley 2000).
For gacaca the criterion of being treated with dignity and respect could be said to
have been partially met. Like the TRC, the gacaca process allowed victims and survivors
to tell their stories in their words (Clark 2010). In addition, the accused were also
supposed to be able to tell their stories and any member of the community was allowed to
speak out, ask questions or make statements about the case at hand. As noted above,
Amnesty officials assert that in the pilot phase of gacaca there were instances wherein the
defendant’s right to speak was abrogated and that a presumption of guilt existed which, if
true, would seriously impinge upon the defendant’s perception of treatment (Amnesty
International 2002). However, according to Clark, this interpretation of gacaca fails to
take into account the local view of gacaca as something more than a legal institution with
larger aims of communal reconciliation rather than just punishment (Clark 2010, 96-97).
It is through this local view of gacaca that we can see some measure of success, from a
communal standpoint, of gacaca in meeting the criterion of dignity and respect.
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Again what we see with this criterion is that the TRC’s efforts appear to be much
more in line with satisfying a perception of treatment with dignity and respect, whether
viewed from a formal perspective or through the folk perspective of ubuntu. By contrast,
gacaca again only meets this criterion partially, and only if we view gacaca through a folk
lens where communal good outweighs individual rights. Unfortunately, the other
indictments of gacaca covered above do much to mitigate this communal good and to
make it appear to be more in the service of the government than of individual
communities.
Opportunity for Voice
In Tyler’s research, participation, or the opportunity for voice, is a key element of
procedural justice. He notes that individuals “feel more fairly treated if they are allowed
to participate…by presenting their suggestions about what should be done” (Tyler 2000,
121). This power is the key that motivates alternative dispute resolution processes like
mediation, but is not limited to arenas where individuals believe that their process
participation will affect outcome. Tyler and his colleagues indicate that there is a value
for people even when their influence is noninstrumental. In these cases the impact of
being able to give voice and be listened to attentively reinforce an individual’s sense of
self-esteem and personal worth (Lind, Tyler, and Huo 1997, 769; Tyler 1987, 343). Like
treatment with respect, the opportunity for voice is something that can be incorporated
into many different fora; but unlike treatment with respect, the opportunity for voice may
be harder to implement, particularly in fora that are based on more formal conceptions of
procedural justice, such as court settings that allow for only limited participation by
victims or defendants (Mertus 2000).
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The TRC sought to incorporate the narratives of all who testified before it,
whether they were victims and survivors or applicants for amnesty. Whether examined
from a formal or folk conception of procedural justice, it appears that the opportunity for
voice was met for all who sat before the HRVC or the AC. However, this opportunity for
voice was lessened somewhat in terms of the HRVC’s selection process for those who
gave it testimony. Although it was not possible for all to tell their stories, there were just
too many and the process for choosing who would appear and who would not was less
than transparent. So too was the process for determining who would appear before the
AC, which was problematic because of a lack of equal opportunity for applicants in
prison to make their best case to the committee.
The HRVC was the most visible committee and conducted its work throughout
the country, holding around eighty hearings across the country where victims were called
to tell their stories. Following this the commission investigated a number of “significant”
or representative cases to gather more detail. Unfortunately, with over 22,000 cases
brought forth by victims or their families, the commission was unable to investigate, or
even highlight them all (van der Merwe 2003, 106). What this meant was that, despite
commendable outreach to the populace, the HRVC’s consultations with communities
were usually quite limited and the process of taking testimony in one location might last
only a single day. Further, the TRC retained control over the selection of cases for public
testimony, at times selecting cases more for their dramatic effect or notoriety; and in
effect reducing the level of control that victims might have felt within the process (van
der Merwe 2003, 111). This meant that victims who applied to the TRC had an unequal
opportunity to give public testimony, though the commission summarized all of victim
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statements in a “victim’s volume” (South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
and Tutu 1998, 576-577). Despite all of this, the cultural lens put forth by ubuntu may
have lessened the impact of selectivity for the HRVC if those who were not able to testify
felt that the stories that were told represented them in some way and, more importantly,
assisted the country at large towards reconciliation.
The gacaca process was designed to allow the maximum amount of voice for all
participants through the purported ability of all present to give testimony or to ask
questions. However, when viewed through a formal procedural justice lens we can see
that the exclusion of RPF and Tutsi crimes lessened the amount of possible voice for
those who had been their victims. The perception of victor’s justice lowers the level of
voice and opportunity for participation, perhaps endangering gacaca’s goal of
engendering reconciliation in Rwanda. However, when we limit ourselves to the process
within gacaca instead of its institutional constraints we find, especially when looking
through our folk lens, that the opportunity for voice is relatively strong with some
exceptions (Clark 2010). These are, namely the early reports that Clark points to wherein
defendants were not given equal opportunity to speak and the Amnesty International
reports that defendants and witnesses were harangued (Amnesty International 2002;
Clark 2009).
Still, despite the fact that actual participation in gacaca is lower than indicated by
many of its proponents, Clark argues that gacaca has “unquestionably” afforded the
population a “rare opportunity” to participate in Rwanda’s national reconstruction and
rebuilding processes (Clark 2010, 153). Furthermore, he argues that it has empowered
many marginalized groups, such as women and youth, and has the potential expand
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participation if the planned extension of gacaca to everyday crimes after the genocide
cases are complete takes place (Clark 2010, 153).
Overall it appears that both processes have had some success in providing the
opportunity for voice, though not without some criticisms. Examining both gacaca and
the TRC through a local conception of procedural justice expands our ability to see
potential opportunities for voice in the sense of being able to tell one’s story to a
sympathetic audience at the TRC or engage in a messy dialog about issues critical to
individual and communal well-being in gacaca. Expanding beyond the formal view of
procedural justice allows us to see these positive elements while recognizing that each
process still has its shortcomings.

Conclusion
Our initial question of whether a nexus of procedural justice and cultural context
could tell us more about why some transitional justice mechanisms are seen as more
successful than others has only been partially answered. Rettig’s analysis of gacaca in
Sovu province showed that confidence in the process fell from 51 percent in 2006 to 38
percent in 2008 while 65 percent indicated that they had confidence in gacca, rising to 67
percent in 2008 (Rettig 2008, 37). These findings are similar to Clark’s data, which
indicate that support for gacaca is generally strong, but that participation has fluctuated
based on security concerns, economic need and on interest in specific aspects of
individual cases (Clark 2010, 148). By contrast, Gibson’s data shows a steady support for
the work of the TRC, even though there is evidence of anger and disappointment in the
lack of reparations made by South Africa’s government (Gibson 2002, 2005). These
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findings are similar to our analysis of procedural justice criteria for these two cases,
finding some support for the argument that higher levels of procedural justice—defined
either formally or locally—corresponds to others’ findings of more support for the
transitional justice mechanism in question. Gibson’s findings of higher support for the
work of the HRVC than the AC correlates with our findings that the HRVC paid more
heed to the procedural justice needs of victims than did the AC, which focused its
procedures more on the perpetrators. Likewise, Rettig’s findings of initial high levels of
support for gacaca that later fell correspond to our analysis that shows that while some
attention was paid to procedural justice criteria at the local level, this was undermined by
decisions at the national level which undercut gacaca’s perceived neutrality and
independence from the political process (Rettig 2008, 40).
Turning in more detail to the TRC, we note a series of processes that have an
interesting mix of success in terms of procedural justice as viewed both formally and
locally. The HRVC seems to have had the most inventive use of local conceptions of
procedural justice through its use of the ubuntu worldview to characterize both its
approach to its witnesses and position on the role of reconciliation (cf Coertze 2001;
Krog 2008b, 2008a; Marx 2002). In doing so, it fulfilled an informal conception of the
criteria for voice and participation for those who testified, as well as trustworthiness,
dignity and respect. By contrast the AC’s reliance upon a more formal conception of
procedural justice may have been wise from a legal perspective, but when viewed
through an informal, ubuntu-based, conception of procedural justice, it left many in South
Africa with a sense that the amnesty process was unfair to victims (Gibson 2002, 2005).
This sense of unfairness may be best characterized by Krog, who argued that it was not
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the failure of retributive justice that created anger at the amnesty process, but the failure
of those who were granted amnesty to abide by the tenets of ubuntu, washing their hands
of the forgiveness that they had received and not acknowledging their interconnectedness
with the victims that angered many South Africans (Krog 2008a, 218-219). Despite this,
the AC did largely fulfill formal criteria for neutrality of the forum and, despite problems
of access, opportunity for voice. The only clear indicator of failure for the TRC is the
failure to date of the RRC to provide what is viewed as adequate levels of restitution for
those who suffered under Apartheid. However, the discontent that this has generated
might be more directed at the Parliament than the TRC as a whole—because in the end it
was the Parliament’s decision to alter the RRC’s recommendations.
As with the TRC, Rwanda’s gacaca courts do well in meeting some aspects of
procedural justice criteria and poorly in others. When examined through an informal
procedural justice lens, gacaca appears to have higher levels of opportunity for voice and
participation, as well as, theoretically, high levels for trustworthiness of the authorities—
given that they come from the local region. However, more formal conceptions for
trustworthiness, treatment with dignity and respect, and opportunity for voice show that,
by Western standards, the lack of legal training for judges, the lack of legal counsel for
defendants and the willingness of the gacaca courts to admit hearsay evidence creates
problems for the international community. Despite this, gacaca has continued to receive
some support, though declining, from Rwandans; indicating that the view of procedural
justice adopted by the tribunals resonates at some levels with the population.
Unfortunately, both for Rwanda and gacaca, the neutrality of the forum has been
compromised both formally and locally by the government’s decision not to allow
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charges to be brought against RPF or former RPF members, tainting the courts with the
perception that they are merely offering victors’ justice. The question of how much
damage this perception will have on Rwanda’s ability to achieve some level of
reconciliation is uncertain at this time, but it seems likely that this choice will breed
resentment that may taint future communal relations.
We would be remiss if we failed to note that the findings with regards to the use
of procedural justice as a measurement of success or failure of specific transitional justice
mechanisms must be taken with a few grains of salt. Just as we caution against viewing
procedural justice criteria only through the lens of formal processes and Western justice,
we should also caution against adopting informal cultural conceptions wholesale. It
seems relatively clear from the mixed records in each of our cases that there are those
who are relatively satisfied with the work that these institutions have done, and in
particular, the manner in which they have done it. But there are also many who
disapprove of the restorative nature of the TRC and of gacaca, feeling that their needs for
justice have been abrogated and that attempts to achieve reconciliation have only brought
more pain (Oppelt 1998; Wilson 2001; Kayigamba 2009). While it is useful to examine
procedural justice through multiple lenses along the notion of legal pluralism, it is also
useful to highlight where perceptions of procedural justice diverge as well as where they
converge.
As a final note, we must pay attention to the fact that this is a preliminary study
that has explored a possibility for examining transitional justice mechanisms using wellrecognized criteria from the field of procedural justice and incorporating ideas about how
these criteria might be viewed in different cultural and contextual settings. In order to test
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these propositions more fully it is necessary to do several things. The first of these would
be to either conduct field research or a field experiment, or to rely upon much more
primary data than was available for this paper. This is needed in order to collect
information that is more precise and focused on the criteria of procedural justice rather
than having to extract information from multiple sources or to extrapolate from existing
materials. The second recommendation is to attempt to study multiple transitional justice
mechanisms in a single cultural context as an attempt to minimize the variation that exists
between cultural settings.
Overall we believe that this research provides a way to show that not only are
there many mechanisms available to implement transitional justice, but there are many
methods of measuring that justice; methods which are not limited to formal conceptions
of procedure or established methods of punishment. Allowing for this diversity in justice
and how we view it only gives more options to those who face the hard questions and the
hard choices of how to address the human rights violations of a former regime.
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